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VII. 
CHAPTER I., 
Antony I s .JHrs t Experienoe in the Orient. 
For a oomprehensive study o~ Antony's relations 
~o the Orient, it is neoessary to take up in some detail 
the prooonsulship of Gabinius in Syria,. for it Vias as oom-
mander of the oavalry that Antony first beoame aoquainted 
with the problems of the land whioh was to play so impor-
tant a part in his later life. At the e~piration of his 
oonsulship, Gabinius suooeeded to Syria (57 B.C.). On 
aooount of the disturbed oonditions there, Rome began to 
appoint for this oountry prooonsuls with the power to levy 
troops and to engage in war. The first of these .sent out 
1 
was Gabinius. When en route ~or his provinoe, he was 
2 joined by Antony as oOllunander of the oavalry. 
---000---
1. Appian,~. 51. Appian, however, oannot always be 
relied upon for oonstitutional matters. Vide Shllrer, 
Hist. Jews, p. 330 n. 2. 
2. Plut., Ant. 3. For some time Antony had been embroiled 
in the disturbanoes of Clodius, but had left Italy for 
Greeoe to esoape trouble from the oomoinations forming against 
Clodius at Rome, and was spending his time in military train-
ing and the praotioe of oratory. Coming at tbis time, the 
offer seemed most opportune, but Antony refused on the ground 
that he did not wish to join the expedition in a private 
oapaoity. On his appointment as oommander of the horse, 
Antony aooepted and set sail with Gabinius. 
2. 
3 
Their military oampaign lay in Judaea. Until 
the time of Pompey, Rome had not direot1y interfered -lti . 
Jewish affairs. The relation of socius atgue amicus had 
been established as early as 166 B.C. when Judas l~acoabeus, 
to strengthen his position as first Hasmonean ru1er,sent 
an embassy to Rome to form an alliance with that but 
vaguely known people, whioh VIas beginning to exert suoh a 
powerful influence in the East. 4 Rome, on her part, was 
glad to receive as a sooius a people who had held out so 
sucoessful1y against the troublesome Antioohus, provided 
that suoh an a1lianoe entailed no more definite aid than 
prestige of the Roman name. Aooording1y, until the time 
of Pompey, Rome had contented herself with vague a1liances. 5 
but by playing one party against another, she was imper-
ceptibly establishing her influenoe as predominate. 
---000 .. --
3. Conditions in Judaea are given in detail, for the abun-
dant souroe material shows many phases of Roman policy and 
provincial administration not so well preserved in the records 
of other nations of the East. 
4. I Maoo. 8,17; Joseph., Antig. ~. XII, 5,8. 
5. Jonathan (I Maoo.~I,l; Joseph. Antig. Jud. XIII, 5,&) 
and Simon (I Maoo. XIV,16; XV, 15-24; Joseph. Antig. Jud. 
XIII, 5,8.) renewed the allianoe. John Hyroanus not only 
renewed the alliance, but after a seoond appeal gained actual 
interferenoe from Rome in" favor of Judaea, in that the senate 
3. 
On the defeat o~ Antioohus and the estaolishment 
oi Syria as a provinoe, Rome ohanged her polioy in regard 
to Judaea an~ interfered more openly in its affairs. There 
seem to have been three ~istinot parties in Judaea: the 
Sadduoees or Hellenizing aristooraoy, distinotly pro-Roman 
in sentiment; the Pharisees, demooratio, religious, and 
somewhat paoifist in tendenoy; and the zealots or national-
6 ists, strongly pro-Parthian in sympathy. At the head of 
- 7 
the pro-Roman party was Antlpater, a native of Idumea · 
8 (Idum) of whioh he was military governor, friend and 
9 
minister of HyroanuB II, a man who had already reoognized 
Rome as a potent faotor in Jewish affairs, a faotor in 
whioh lay his ohief hope for the realization of his own 
ambitious designs. Thruout Antipater's entire oareer, 
he always oame forward as the ohampion of Roman interests 
---000--, .. 
ordered Antioohus to restore territory taken in war (Joseph. 
Antig. ~. XIII, a.,2sq; XIV, 8.,Zsq.) Aristobulus and 
Alexander Jannaeus were aole liO mainlialn their power without 
Roman allianoe (Joseph. Antig. Jud. XIII, ~lsq.). 
6. Radin, Jews amOng Gks • . ~~. p.216. For a delial1ed 
hisliory of the development o~ the anti-Hellenistio Jews with 
~harisees see Hereford, Phar. pp. 1-67. 
the - Radin, p. 156, says a 
he does not believeAPharisees were related to or oonliinuation 
tne A 
oiAanti-Hellenl0 Hasadim. 
7. Nioolaus of Damasous, , G H. Vol. III, p. 417. 
8. Joseph. Antig. Jud. XIV, 8,1; Bell. ~. I, 6,2. 
9. Ibid. 
4. 
in Judaea. His first opportunity came in the civil war 
between Hyrcanus, the legitimate heir, and his younger 
but more capable brother, Aristobulus. Backed by the 
nationalists, Aristobulus had gained the kingdom and the 
10 high priesthood, and had reduced Hyrcanus to the stand-
ing of a private oitizen. 11 
Antipater recognized this opportunity and came 
to his aid. Hyrcanus re-engaged in the struggle with 
12 
no little success, but before the quarrel was settled, 
the Roman general Scaurus appeared in Syria. Each con-
testant sent an embassy to him with the promise of 400 
talents for a favorable decision. Aristobulus suoceeded 
in establishing his power through the influence of Soaurus 
who felt that Aristobulus was the wealthier of the two . 
claimants and consequently the more able to fulfill his 
. 13 prom1ses. No one regarded the matter as settled, how-
ever, for when Pompey arrived in Damascus (B.C. 64) there 
was a renewal of the embassies from Hyrcanus and Aristo-
---000---
10. Joseph. Antig. Jud. XIV, 3,1; Bell. Jud. XX, 10. 
11. Ibid. XIV, 1,2; Bell. Jud. I, 6,1. 
12. lbid. XIV, 2,1-2. 
13. Ibid. XIV, 2,3. 
5. 
buluS. 14 Pompey s~owed himself a better judge of con-
ditions in Judaea as well as a truer e~ponent of Roman 
policy by supporting the weaker party, lest later on he 
should find in ~he ambitious Aristobulus 'a uan 
unwilling to submit to Rome's domina~ion in the internal 
affairs of Judaea. The influenoe of the politic Anti-
pater must have had weight with Pompey in his decision. 
Aris~obulus, however, defied the Roman authority. He 
made his final stand on the Temple Mount where he was 
besieged for three months, un~il, by an attack on the 
Sabbath, the fortress fell and the Holy City came under 
R d 15 a oman cornman ere 
At Pompey's oommand the ci~y walls were de-
stroyed and Jerusalem and the surrounding territory made 
16 
tributary. The Hellenistio cities of Coele-Syria were 
17 ~aken from Judaea and added to the province of Syria. 
The contracted Jewish territory was given to Hyrcanus II, 
---000---
14. Joseph. Antig. Jud. XIV, 3,2. 
15. Ibid. XIV, 4,2~4; Bell. Jud. I, 7,3-5;Dio, XXXVII, 16; 
Strabo, 16, 2,40; Liv. Epit. 102; Tao. Hist, V,9; Appian, 
.m. 50; Mith. 106. 
16. Joseph. Antig. Jud. XIV, 4,4; ~. ~. 1,7,6. The 
tribute was levied on the Jews as a people, not on Hyrcanus 
as a ruler. Ibid. Antiq. Jud. XIV, 4~sq; Bell. Jud. 1,7,6; 
Dio, XXXIX, 56,6. 
17. Joseph. Antig. Jud. XIV,4,4; Bell. ~. I, 7,6-7. 
who was recognized as high priest without the title of 
18 
king. Judaea itself seems to have been under the 
19 
general supervision of the Syrian proconsul. Pompey 
6. 
took Aristobulus and his children as prisoners to Rome where 
20 they were used in his triumph. Pompey had not crushed 
the nationalist party, however. Alexander, the son of 
Aristobulus had escaped from Pompey. At the coming of 
Gabinius, (57 B.C.) he was rallying the anti-Roman element 
to his standard with great success. Indeed he had gone 
so far 8S to come to Jerusalem and to begin to rebuild 
the walls. On hearing that Gabinius was advancing in 
Judaea, Alexander quickly assembled and armed his forces 
and fortified Alexandrium, Hyrcanium,and Macherus. 21 
Gabinius sent Antony in advance to arm the pro-Roman Jews 
and the Idumeans whom Antipater had collected in persuance 
of his policy of establishing his ovm position firmly by 
making himself indispensable to the Romans. 22 
---000---
18. Joseph. Antig. Jud. XIV.4,4; Bell. Jud. I,7,6-7. 
l~. Amm. Marc. XIV, 8,12; Joseph. Antig. ~. XIV, 79. 
20. Ibid. XIV.4.5; Bell. ~. 1.7,7. According to 
Morrison, Jews under Roman ~ p. 37, Psalm VIII, 16-26 
refers to Pompey. 
21. Ibid. XIV,6,2; Bell. Jud. I.8,2; Zonar. V,7. 
22. Hegissip. I,19. Cf. article Gablnius in Pauly-~lss~a. 
7. 
the confidence that Gabinius thus placed in him, Antony 
was enabled to become acquainted with the leaders of the 
pro-Roman Jews. Josephus says that he even formed a 
guest friendship with Antipater at this time. 23 When 
Gabinius came up, Alexander was defeated in battle near 
Jerusalem and retreated with what remained of his forces 
24 to Alexandrium. For his distinguished services in 
the first attack on this fortress, Gabinius left Antony 
in charge of the siege while he himself made a tour of 
25 Judaea. On his return the siege was pressed with vigor 
26 
until Alexandrium surrendered. In this campaign Antony 
had had an opportunity to learn the political factions at 
work in Judaea, to see the advantage to Rome in fostering 
the interests .of the Idumean family, and in Gabinius's sub-
sequent reorganization of Judaea,to observe the methods 
---000---
23. Joseph. Antig. ~. XIV,13,1. The fortress of Alex-
andrium was situated on one of the mountains somewhere 
between Jerusalem and Scythopolis. It seems probable that 
it can be located as the ruins on Qarn Sartabeh. Cf. Schmidt, 
Alexandrium, Journal of Bibl. Lit. 78 sq. 
24. Joseph. Antig. Jud. XIV,13,l; ~.Jud. I, 8,3; Zonar.V,7. 
25. Joseph. Antig. Jud. XIV,5,3; Bell. Jud. 1,8,4. On 
this tour Gabinius gave orders for the rebuilding of such 
cities as had been destroyed. Among them were Samaria, 
AshdOd, Soythopolls,Anthedron, Raphla, and Dora. 
26. Ibid. XIV,5,4; Bell.~. 1,8,5. 
8. 
of organization employed by a Roman eovernor in his provin-
cial administration. 
In this nork Gabinius followed the policy estab-
lished by Pompey, that of reducing the large po',7ers that 
were developing by breaking their territory up into smaller 
27 
units. Accordingly he divided Judaea into five districts 
Hi th a Sa~hedrin28 in each, ,,!hich held the £"overning povler. 29 
Hyrcanus VTaS deprived of politi cal pOVler and as high priest 
dictated to the Je~s in religious matters alone. Rome 1.'TaS 
al\-rays opposed to small theocratic states having e:xtensive 
territory governed and taxed by the priests of the Temple. 
30 Strabo cites several other instances of this Roman policy 
of diminishing the power and privileges of the priest. 31 
---000---
27. Hegissip. I, 19. 
28. Joseph. Antiq. Jud., XIV, 5,4. 
tion of the Sanhedrin in Josephus. 
This is the first men-
The supreme court of 
justice had probably been called the Sanhedrin for some 
time, but after the settlement of Gabinius the court at 
Jerusalem ':.'as knm'!Il a~ the "Great Sanhedrin" as a distin-
euishing mark. Cf. Eastines, ]i£!. ~. IV, p. 397, Art. 
Sanhedrin. 
29. The capitols r!ere at .Jerusalem, Amathus, Jericho, Sap-
phoria and Gadara. Joseph. Antiq. Jud. XIV, 5,4. For a 
summary of the reorganization of Judaea vide Sands, ~. 
Client l 'rinces. Appendix A, XV. 
30. Strabo, XII, 8, 14; XII, 3, 37. 
31. Cf. Arnold, Rom. Imp., p. 227. 
9. 
The anti-Roman element was still resiiive. 
Under the leadership of Aristobulus,who had escaped 
from Roce,a second revolt arose. Pi tholaus, vTho had been 
a Roman lieutenant at Jerusalem,deserted to him with 1000 
men. Their first plan '.'las to fortify Alexandri~, but 
at the advance of the Roman forces under Sisenna, Servilius, 
32 
and Antony, Aristobulus retreated to Macherus, the second 
33 fortress of Judaea after Jerusalem according to Pliny. 
34 Here again Antony distinguished himself for valiant conduct. 
30 Aristobulus VIas taken prisoner and sent back to Rome. 
With the anti-Roman Jews temporarily in check, Gabinius 
turned his attention toward the parthians. 36 
Mithridates, king of Parthia, had declared war on 
Armenia to regain GOrdyene~7 Since this territory had been 
granted to Armenia by Pompey, such action was an encroach-
---000---
32. Joseph. Antig. Jud. XIV, 6,1; Bell. Jud. I, 8, 6. 
33. !:....li. Vt 72. 
34. Plut. t Ant. 3-, Hegeslpp. I, 19-20. 
35. Joseph. Antig. Jud. XIV, 0, 1-, Bell. ~. 18, 6-, Zonar. 
V, 7-t Dio, XXXIX, 56,6; Strabo, XVII, 11,11. 
36. Since Gabinius did not complete his Parthian campaign, 
the discussion of the Parthian question v1ill be taken up later. 
37. Just. XLII,4. 
10. 
ment upon the authority of Rome. Mithridates met with 
38 
some success, but civil strife in Parthia soon put a-
different aspect on affairs. Mithr1da~es was driven from 
the throne on account of the cruelty of his rUle. 39 
Orodes, his brother, however granted him ~he government of 
40 Media, but,when this too was taken ~rom him, he sought 
refuge with Gabinius who now continued the war begun by 
Mithridates with the expectation of achieving lasting fame 
in establishing Mithrida~es on ~he throne as a client prince 
of Rome. 41 Gabinius had just passed the Euphrates when he 
received instructions from Pompey to give up ~his expedition 
42 
and ~o rernstate Ptolemy Auletes on the throne. 
Antony was to have an opportunity to gain flrs~ 
hand knowledge of one of Rome's most serious problems. The 
settlement of the Egyptian question was one o~ ~he most im-
portant political tasks of Rome. It was taken more and ) more into consideration by each o~ the great leaders in 
---000---
38. Cf. Rawlinson, Par~h. p. 147, n.4. 
39. Just., XLII, 4. 
40. Dio, XXXIX, 56. 
41. Appian,~. 51. 
42. Dio, XXXIX, 55-56; Joseph. Antig. Jud. XIV, 6,2. 
11. 
turn,until it was finally settled by Octavian. 43 
In 65 B.C. Caesar and Crassus had looked to Egypt 
as a base in which·to establish their power while Pompey 
was otherwise engaged. They tried to have a measure passed 
by a pleoescite, granting to Caesa~ for the purpose of 
settling affairs in Egyp~ a command extraordinary, such as 
Pompey had held. ~as to create for himself a 
military and political position - a counterpoise of the 
Democrats to the power of the Optimates represented by 
Pompey and his army.44 The united power of Caesar and 
Crassus, however, failed to overcome the hostile influence 
of ~he Senate. The Senate did not wish ~o entangle itself 
by forming into a province a land with such economic ad-
vantages, for by commanding its financial organization and 
naval power to his own use, a strong governor would be but 
a s~ep from monarchial power. 45 ConsequentlY the question 
was dropped for the ~ime being. 
---000---
Ucise, 
43. Cf.~R~m. Geschichte, p. 22~,23b,24~, cited by von Mess, 
Caesar, p.29, n. 44. 
44. Cf. hlommsen, Rom. Hist., Vol. IV, 201; Adolph von Mess, 
Caesar, pp. 29,30; Mahaffy, Hist. Egypt., p. 228. 
45. Cf. Mommsen, Rom.Hist., Vol.IV, 67; von Mess, Caesar, 
pp. 29,30. Suet.Caes. 35 states that Caesar kept Egypt under 
rule of Cleopatra for fear that under a headstrong governor 
the province would be ~ome a source of revolution. 
45. ~uet. Caes. b4. 
12. 
After the triumvirate had been renewed at Luc-
ca, it seems that an agreement must have been made by 
the triumvirs as to Egypt. The very fact that Gabinius, 
already launched wi~h seeming success upon a Parthian cam-
paign, WOuld, at a suggestion from Pompey, immediately drop 
his O\VU alluring plan~ pOints to the fact that the trium-
virate had in all prooability selected the staunch Pompeian, 
Gabinius, as Syrian proconsul with the Egyptian question in 
view. His value as a tool hau been demonstrated in his 
work on the Gabinian law. Ptolemy, who had purohased his 
first recognition as sovereign at a price o~ 6000 talents,46 
had agreed to a further payment of 10,000 talents for his 
restoration. 47 The Senate, however, passed no decree 
giving Gabinius authority to wage offensive war outside 
his province, and even brought :t"orward a prediotion from 
the Sibylline books forbidding such action. 48 i Perhaps 
, , 
I . t .. . . - . 
this accounts for Gabinius's heSitancy, for Plutarch says 
that most of ~he officers as well as Gabinius himself were 
opposed to the enterprise, but that Antony joined in per-
---000---
46. Suet. Caes. 54. 
47. Plut. Ant. 3; Dio 3~,55-58; Appian, B.C. II, 24; Joseph. 
Antig. Jud., XIV, 6:2; Bell. ~. I, ~,7;Cl0. ~. Rob. ~. 
VIII, 22; Plut. Cat. Min., 35. 
48. Appian, B.C. II, 24; ~. 51. 
13. 
suading Gabinius. Plutarch assigns Antony's eagerness to 
a longing for great exploits and a desire to gratify Ptolemy's 
49 
request. Perhaps Antony felt that the surest way of ad-
vancement for a young man at l{ome \"faS to cater to the Yfishes 
\\ of the great political lead.ers until his own posi tion rms 
someYlhat assured. ) Accordingly Gabinius raade a pretext of 
the alleged s~rt of piracy by the Bgyptians and the build-
ing of a fleet by Archelaus to start immediately for the Egyp-
50 
tian frontier. 
The most dangerous point in the expedition ~as the 
march through the sandy desert between Gaza and Pelusium 
v/here no fresh vlater could be obtained. Antony VIaS sent 
ahead to make himself master of the passes and to v:in Pelu-
sium. By his eminent suocess he rendered the march safe for 
51 the army. In the military engagements following Antony 
was rewarded \7i th especial marks of distinction for bravery 
52 in action. 
--~oOo---
49. Plut. Ant. 3. 
50. Strabo, XII, 3, 34; ~ic. pro. flab. Post. VIII; Eh!l,II,19. 
51. Joseph. Antig. ~.,XIV, 6, 2, attributes this entirely 
to the influence of Antipater, but here, as in regard to the 
aid rendered Caesar in the Bellum Alexandrlnum,he probably 
l:as exaggerated the importanoe' 0 f the se:rvices of Antipater, 
for he is not mentioned by Plutarch in ~his instanoe nor by 
the author of the Bellum Alexandrinum in the case of ~aesar. 
52. ~lut.!Ei. 3. 
14. 
On his recall to Judaea by the renewed uprisings 
of the anti-Roman Jews53 soon after the final defeat of 
the Egyptians, Gabinius left a garrison of Roman troops 
54 in Alexandria to maintain the authority of Ptolemy. An-
tony also probably remained in Alexandria for some time 
for Josephus makes no mention of him in the SUbsequent cam-
paign in Syria. 55 By assuming many of the prerogatives 
of the palace guards, these troops which were left in Alex-
andria became a powerful factor there. It is important 
to note that it was among these troops that Antony had won 
a great name for personal valor and military ability in his 
conduct of the oampaign at Pelusium. The populace of Al-
exandria likewise honored him for his clemency toward the 
56 Egyptians after the viotory. 
-----//~ In these years in which Antony had been wi th Gab-
inius he had had unusual opportunities to become acquainted 
with three of Rome's great problems in ~he East: Judaea, 
First, in his stay in Judaea he could 
---000---
53. Joseph. Antig. Jud. XIV, 6,2; Bell. Jud. I, 8,7. 
54. Val. Max. IV, 1,15; Caes. B.C.III,l03; Dio.XLII,6. 
55. Appian, B.C. V,8, states that Antony met Cleopatra and 
became infatuated with her,although she was only about four-
. 
teen years of age. The early maturity of the peoples of the 
East must be taken into consideration, however. Appian's 
statement is one of interest rather than of importance. 
56. Plut. Ant. 3. 
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see the strong anti-Roman party dependent on the Hasmonean 
house for its leaders. That this party was strongly pro-
Parthian was a fact little realized by Rome. Actual ex-
perience in Judaea seemed to be requisite for a comprehen-
sion of the hearty support that the Parthians gave every 
Syrian state against Rome. After Antony's early experi-
ence in Judaea, he could judge· the value of the Idumean 
,/" -
family in furthering Roman interests; he could observe in 
the work of Gabinius the tasks which lay before a governor 
in dealing with such conditions. 
~le the expedition against the Parthians had 
been of short duration, Antony had at least become acquainted 
with Parthian modes of warfare, had heard some discussion as 
to routes to be pursued, ana had seen the advantagew Rome 
of the constant intrigue in the Parthian court. The ex-
perience gained on this expedition, comoined with the know-
ledge acquired in Judaea, enaoled Antony to judge the im-
portance Which Parthia held in the Orient, a place not suf-
l'iciently recognized by the Roman leaders. With all this 
in mind after the Ides of March he ViaS aole to appreciate 
at the moment more than any other man the value of Caesar's 
plans for an Oriental campaign. 57 
---OUo---
57. It is strange that Ferrero has not notea the probable 
influence on Antony of this campaign with Gaoinius. He 
merely mentions that Antony was an officer with Gaoinius. 
Greatness and Decline of Rome, II, p.64. 
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~_~he Egyptian expedition he had seen the econ-
omic and political conaition of Egypt at first hand, the 
dominating part that Alexandria played in Egyptian affairs, 
~he aominating place that the mob ana the palace soldiery 
held in Alexandria, and especially the vast financial re-
sources of the rulers. Allor this knowledge was to stand 
him in good stead in bis later work in the Orient. 
---00000---
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CHAPTER II. 
;f Conditions in the East. 
~ter Philippi (Ootober 42, B.C.) the position of 
Antony ~as a~sured, since the soldiers considered that the 
victory was due largely to him, on account of Ootavian's 
illness at the time of the battle.~_J Accordingly his was 
the deciding voice in the arrangements which followed. He 
chose the East. 2 Moreover he took Gallia Narbonensis from 
Lepidus, and retained Gallia Comata and Cis-Alpine Gaul, 
Which he held by a previous arrangement of the triumvirs. 3 
It is important to note that he retained these large inter-
ests in the West. 
It seems hardly probable that Antony had a dream 
of a great empire such as had been the hope of the great 
leaders of the East since the time of Alexander, nor on the 
other hand did he ohoose the East for the easy indulgenoe 
of his sometimes exaggerated sensuality. He was a faith-
ful pupil of Caesar under whom he had served in Gaul as a 
trusted lieutenant, at the outbreak of the civil war as 
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1. Appian, B.C. IV,lOB; V,14; suet. Aug. 13. 
2. Eutrop. VII,3; Joseph. Antig. Jud. XIV.12,2; Liv.~. 
CXXV; Strabo XVII, 1,12. 
3. Dio, XLVI,55; ApFian, B.C. IV,2. For a discussion of 
the division of the provinoes vide Ganter, Prove ~., 
pp. 1-8. 
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champion of his interests, at Pharsalia as commander of the 
left wing, during Caesar's absence from Italy as his special 
representative in Rome, and on his death as guardian of his 
papers. Under Caesar's influence for so long a tim~ Antony 
must have come to regarCl. the East as the proper sphere of 
Roman aggression. In the East were highly cultivated lands, 
important trade routes from the Orient, and wealthy cities 
famed for commerce and manufacture. From an economio view-
point Syria espeoially was second only to Egypt in import-
ance. Altho by means of irrigation agriculture thrived in 
these highly cultivated lands, it was in manufaotures that 
Syria laid her chief claim to riches. 4 The seaports were 
commercial centers not only i'or their own produots, but also 
for the great quantities of goods brought along the Euphrates 
trade routes. 5 When Cicero says that the land of Asia is 
so fertile that in the productivity of its fields, in the 
variety of its produce, in the extent of its pasture lands 
and in the variety of its exports it excells all other lands, 
can it be wondered then ttat hesbould maintain that in the 
~ast ·..,ere Rome's largest and most certain revenues upon which 
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4. Sidon was famed for her glass manufaoture; Tyre, Sarepta, 
Dora, and Caesarea for their purple dyes; Berytes. and Tyre 
for their fine linens and silks. 
5. ~f. Mommsen, Rom. Prove II, pp. 148-15~. 
6 her very life depended. Antony needed money. 
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In addi-
tion to the vast sums required for the maintenance of 
their power, the triumvirs owed 5000 dracr~ae to each sol-
dler. To collect this money was one of Antony's tasks,7 
but before regular payments could be assured, steps had to 
be taken to re~stablish Roman adminis~ration in the East, 
so completely disorganized had it become during the years 
o~ the civil ~ars. To re~stablish the authority of Rome 
in that district upon Vlhich the revenue of the Roman people 
8 
was so largely dependent was ~o be Antony's greatest 1,-lOrk. 
In the accomplishment of this work it appears that Antony, 
instead or estaolishing kingdoms here and there as his fanoy 
dictated, followed a most consistent plan, a plan which the 
great powers of to;..day still employ, that of the buffer-
state. Vlhat could be more in aocordance VIi th Roman method 
than to organize the numerous peoples of Syria and Asia Minor9 
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6. Cio. a4. Fam. XV,l; Man. Leg. II,VI,VII. The annual 
tribute acquired by Pompey in the East was 35,000,000 drach-
mae. Before this the entire annual revenue of Rome had 
been bO,OOO,OOO. (Plutarch, Pomp.45. Cf.Tenney Frank, Rom. 
Iml2,. p.327) 
7. Pluto Ant. 23; Appian, B.C. V,3; Dio, XLVIII,30. 
8. VeIl. Pat. 11,74; Suet. Aug. XIII. 
9. The term Asia Minor is first found in Oros. 1,2 (about 
410 A.D.) Anoients used the terms "On this side of the 
Taurus". Cf Bevan, House of Seleuous, Vol.I, p.76. 
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into buffer-states against the po~er of ?arthia and to in-
sure the safety of these st~tes against the inroads of this 
country by a successful predatory raid into its territory? 
To comprehend the r.a gni tude of the task ".'hich lay before him, 
a consideration of the complications in Asia Minor and In 
S;yria: and the i·orces at ,"lork to produce these conditions \7111 
be necessary. 
From the earliest times there had never been either 
a national or a political union in Asia Minor. The Persian 
subjugation of Asia Minor was very incomplete. That empire 
could never establish its porler firmly at any great distance 
from the great highways, consequently the mountain-peoples 
continued to obey their hereditary chiefs with the necessity 
now and then of iurnishing troops or tribute to the fovern~ 
mente Often, to eliminate trouble so far as was possible, 
these chiefs were recognized as the representatives of the 
imperial E'overnrnent in return for payment of tribute. No 
central £,o:verrl.r.lent therefore l"as able to form a real poli-
tical union in Asia ~inor. 
The Greeks had early replaced, by their highly 
organized network of self-governing cities, the rUdimentary 
social and political organizations, in which as a rule the 
10 
village VIas the unit. \'ihile, \,li th a few exceptions 
along the roads, there rTere no Greek cities more than fifty 
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10. Cf. Arnold, Rom. Imp. p. 227; Chapot, Prove Rom. p.l03. 
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miles ~rom the coast, these cities have been estimated to 
have been 500 in numberll and in many cases rich and popu-
lous centers of Greek li~e and civilization. They were 
compelled to carry out their administration to a large ex-
tent with and through these cities. 
In Syria during the last years o~ the House o~ 
Seleucus, the actual masters were the Arabian princes of 
12 
the desert, the Jews, the Nabateans and rObber chieftains. 
In constant conflict VIi th one another, these prinoes had 
orought Syria to a state of ruin. On the coming of Pompey 
(64 B.C.) the usurpers were set aSide, the Arabs restricted 
to their own domain, and the robber chiefs forced to give 
13 
up their strongholds or to pay large tribute. Syria, 
with the exception of the cities which were given their 
freedom and districts left to national dynasts under Roman 
int'luence, was made a Roman province and put under the 
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11. Arnold, Rom. Imp. p. 232; Duruy, Hist. Rome, p. 711. 
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12. Uo~sen, Rom. Hist. p. 422. Of the 1ast . class, for 
example, was the pOVler!'ul Ptolomaeus, son of Mennaeus of 
Chalcis, one of the richest men o~ the period. He ruled 
over the territpry between the Lebanon and anti-Lebanon as 
well as along the lower half of the valley of Coele-Syria, 
inclUding the cities of Heliopolis (Balbec) and Chalcis. 
He maintained 8000 horsemen · at his own expense. 
13. Joseph. Antig. Jud. XIV, 3,2. 
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14 direct rule of a Roman governor. The kingdom of the House 
of Seleucus had come to an end. 15 The Roman organization, 
however, was more nominal than real. \lith civil war raging 
in Rome the deposed princes appear again ~o have profited by 
. 16 
the general disorganizat~on. In ~he disaffec~ion of ~hese 
princes was a very real danger to the Roman East. On ~he 
other side of ~he Syrian desert were the Parthians, ever Via tch-
ful and alert, .the hereditary enemies of the Greek East and 
17 its successor, the Roman Empire. "\';hen ~he Romans in the 
last age of ~he Republic came into immediate con~act with Iran 
they found in existence the Persian empire regenerated by the 
Parthians".18 The latter had championed the cause of the 
Syrian princes in pursuance 0 f their policy of strengthening 
any resistance to the power of Rome. Parthia was rapidly be-
coming a most important factor in the Roman policy in the 
Orient. It ras ~he only great stated upon which Rome bor-
dered. 
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~., JV, pp. 400-453. 
15. Bevan, House of Seleucus, II, p. 267; Liommsen, ~. 
~. · IV, pp. 162-170. 
16. Cassius encouraged many of them in return for money 
payments. 
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As long as Armenia maintained itself as a power 
to be feared in the Orient the Parthians had been more or 
. 19 less friendly to the Romans as the enemy of their common 
foe, Tigranes. Pompey and Phraates even made an alliance 
with the provision that Phraates should invade Armenia while 
Pompey fought Mithridates and as a reward Gordyeme, which 
Armenia had seized, should be returned to Parthia. After 
the fall of the Pontic kingdom Pompey, true to the Roman 
policy of favoring a weakened andpawerless foe at ·the ex-
pense of an ally who was in a position to become dangerous, 
left Tigranes in full possession of his kingdom, the prov-
ince of Gordyene included. 20 Vllien Phraates attempted to 
seize the province Pompey's legate Afranius promptly drove 
his troops from the country. Nor did the Romans respect 
the Euphrates as the boundary granted by LUCUllus~l for 
rulers of Edessa were received under Roman protection. 
Everything seemed to point toward the establishment of the 
great Syro-Mesopotamian desert as a boundary, with Armenia 
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19. Strabo, XVI, 1,28. 
20. Ibid. VI, 1,24; Appian, M!lh. 105. 
the 
21. Vide Mommaen, ~. Hiat. IV, p.343, for~treaty be-
tween Luoullus and the Parthians. 
in the position of a Roman client state. 
between Parthia and Rome was impossible. 
24. 
Permanent peace 
"The subsistence 
side by side of great states with equal rights ViaS incom-
patible with the system of Roman policy, we may even say of 
antiquity in general. The Roman empire knew as a limit in 
the strict sense only the sea or a land district unarmed."22 
On the murder of Phraates by his sons Mithridates assumed 
the offensive against Rome by declaring war on Armenia in a 
dispute over boundaries, but civil strife arose in Parthia 
and Mithridates fled to Gabinius,as has been mentioned be-
fore. Crassus took up the interrupted plans of his prede-
cessor only to meet with disaster at Carrhae. The Parthians 
now had absolute control beyond the Euphrates~ana Armenia be-
came a Parthian dependency. The policy of agression, which 
the Parthians consistently pursued until after the defeat 
or their leaders, Labienus and Pacorus, now brought them 
into alliance with the Jews ana other peoples of Syria who 
vlere eager to be relieved ·of Roman d.omination. 
The importance of Parthian influenoe in Judaea 
must not De underestimated. It must be remembered that 
Parthia was a continuatio~ of Persia and that of all foreign 
domination the Persian rule was the one which the Jews most 
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r,'hile it can be assumed that there 
had long been a pro-Parthian party in Judaea fostered by the 
communica tion of the Jews in the tV10 countries, it \'laS' not 
until after the defeat of Crassus that the first record of 
an actual alliance is found. The Roman disaster at Carrhae 
stimulated the anti-Roman Jews to action,and an alliance 
was formed uith the Parthians in the hope that through them 
Roman intluence could be destroyed and the old theocratic 
government restored. Pitholaus,who,since his desertion 
24 to Ale~ander at the time of the revolt against Gabinius, 
had established himself as the leader of the Na~ionalists, 
jOined ~he Parthians in their attack on the remnant of the 
army of CrasEus, vlhich had been reorganized under Cassius 
longinus. The time seemed opportune, for large bodies of 
Parthians had crossed the Euphrates and were ravaging Syria. 
The Roman troops were inadequate,and there was little con-
fidence to be placed in a levy to be raised in the provinces~ 
for au~iliaries f"rom the allies, owing to the harshness and 
injustice of Roman rule, were either so disaftected toward 
Rome that it was impossible to trust them or were too weak 
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24. Joseph. Antig. Jud. XIV, 6,1; Bell. Jud. I, 8,6. 
26. 
to be of any considerable service. 25 Contrary to all ex-
pectations, Cassius drove ~he Parthians from the neighbor-
hood of Antioch and, after defeating them in an ambuscade, 
26 killed their leader Osaces. The army of Pitholaus was 
also defeated and he himself put to death, largely through 
~he influence of An~ipater, who feared his power among the 
anti-Roman Jews. 27 The Parthians VIi thdrew into \7in ter 
quarters in eastern Syria, YThere they remained during the 
winter months in the expectation of a renewed attack in the 
spring of 50 B.C.; but, owing to civil dissension at home, 
the troops were recalled and the danger to Roman interests 
28 
averted. 
During the civil "Jar in Rome, most of ~he great 
leaders in turn came to Syria, some to recruit money and 
sUpplies, others ~o put do'::n oisturbances. The politic 
Antipater, changing sides as the fortunes of the leaders 
changed, made himself so useful to each in turn that his 
former alliances were overlooked. In return for aid given 
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26. Cic. ad Att. V, 20; 18; ad Fam. II, 10; XV,14; .l!'rontin. 
~rateg. II, 5,35; Dio, XL, 29. 
27. Joseph. Antig. Jud. XIV, 7,1. 
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when victory seemed hopeless at Alexandria,29 Caesar re-
stored to the Jews many of the privileges of which Pompey 
had deprived them. He confirmed Hyrcanu6 as hereditary 
30 High Priest, and appointed him ethnarch of'the Jews, thus 
restoring him to the political status taken ai'lay by Gabini-
us. 31 He made Antipater a Roman citizen and procurator of 
32 Judaea. 
Now that Antipater vIas established as the repre-
sentative of Rome in Judaea, he set about restoring order. 
He made his son Phaselus governor of Jerusalem and its sur-
rounding territory and his younger son Herod governor of 
Galilee. 33 The energetic Herod soon quarreled with the 
anti-Roman Sanhedrin, and was i"orced to flee for his life 
34 to Sextus Caesar who championed his cause and made him 
---000---
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30. Joseph. Antig. Jud. XIV, 8,3-5. 
31. Ibid. XIV, 117, gives the powers of an ethnarch. Cf 
also Sands, Rom. Client Princes, appendix. 
32. It is impossible to determine exactly what Josephus 
mean8 by procurator, for his use of teohnioa1 terms is 
extremely vague. Cf Mommsen, ~.Prov. II, p.189, n. 
33. Joseph. Antig. ~. XIV, 9,2; Bell. Jud., r,lO. 
34. Joseph. Antig. ~. XIV, 9,1. 
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general of the army of Coele-Syria. He ViaS deterred from 
his intention of making rlar on the anti-Roman I'action in 
Judaea35 and Vlas for some time engaged in helping Sextus 
with his work as governor of Syria. 
At this juncture (46 B.C.) the Pompeian party 
rallied about Caecilius Bassus and put Sextus Caesar to 
death. Bassus seems to have been seeking an independent 
principality for himself in syria. 36 Antipater sent aid 
under his two sons to Antistius Vetus, Caesar's represen-
ta ti ve, 37 while the Parthians, vii th whom Pompey himself 
had made negotiations and who had remained friendly to his 
cause,38 sent aid to Bassus then besieged in Apamea.3~ 
With their assistance Bassus continued to maintain his 
Position during the year 45. This aggression on the part 
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36. Dio, XLVII, 26-27; Liv. ~. 114; Joseph. Antig. Jud. 
XIV, 11,1; Appian, B.C. III, 77; IV, 58. 
37. Joseph. Antig. Jud. XIV, 11,1; Bell. Jud. I,lO. 
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of the Parthians probably hastened Caesar in his plans for 
a great campaign in the Orient.40 
an end to these plans. 
His assassination put 
In October 44 B.C. 41 Cassius went into Syria to 
gain . this province for the Liberators and to raise money 
for their cause.42 He won over the forces besieging Bassue 
at Apamea43 and later even the forces of Bassus himself. 44 
In this way a division of Parthiane came into the power of 
C . 45 assl.Us. An opportunity seemed to offer itself to Cas-
sius to carry out Pompey's plan of seeking aid from Parthia.46 
He dismissed the Parthians with gifts and sent with them an 
embassy to Orodes, the king, ~o ask for aid. 47 The Parthi-
ans recognized the fact that it nas to their advantage for 
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p.107. 
42. Dio, XLVII, 21; VeIl. Pat. II,62; Cic. R!!!l. XI,27. 
43. Dio, XLVII, 28; Appian, B.C. IV, 58. 
44. Cia. ~ Fam. XII, 11,12; Joseph. Antig. Jud. XIV, 11, 
12; Bell. Jud. I, 11,1. 
45. Appian, B.C. IV, 59. 
46. Ibid. II, 83. 
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Roman arms to be engaged in civil war rather than to be 
turned against them. 
48 thian horse. 
Accordingly they sent a body of Par-
After his victory at Apamea, CaSSius set to l70rk 
to obtain ::funds for the Liberators by levying exorbitant 
tribute. Antipater, consistent to his policy of proving 
himself valuable to each Roman leader in turn, immediately 
made efforts to collect the portion assigned to him. It 
was through such financial speculations as this that the 
prO-Roman Jews had grown apart from the reactionary element. 
The life of these capitalists involved a close association 
Vii th the Roman officials. Marked discrepancies of social 
custom such as dietary regulations and differences in dress 
were untenable. The pro-Roman Jews were largely the moneyed 
class, composed not of the great landholders, but of men 
whose fortunes had been made by the Roman system of taxation; 
whose very existence depended upon the supremacy of Roman 
49 power. Herod, rlOrking for his own interests as well as 
those ot' the Romans, then, Y,as the first to hand in his 
quota,and as a reYlard Cas8ius appOinted him general of Coe1e-
Syria. 50 On the other hand, ,-,hen a city t-ailed to raise its 
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49. Cf Radin, Jews amone Gks. and Rorr.s. pp. 12~-130. 
50. Joseph. Aptig. Jud. XIV, 11,4. 
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assessment, Cassius sold the intabitants into slavery.5l 
As a result war broke out again in Judaea, for this out-
come of at':fairs ViaS a great blow to the Nationalists Vlho had 
held high hopes of the fall of the Idumeans on the death of 
Caesar. They had not realized that the Idumeans ,'lere sup-
porting the Roman interests for selfish motives and that 
the ".,ily Antipater '.'lould ingratiate himself into the i'avor 
of each faction in turn. VJhen it VIas rumored that Herod 
was to be made king of the Jews, t~e Nationalists contrived 
52 
to have Antipater poisoned. Cassius supported Herod in 
his efforts to have the murder avenged, and Hyrcanus, al-
though the murderer had been his friend, took no steps to 
protect him pIlen he realized that he was being punished with 
the approval of Cassius. Thereafter Hyrcanus was under 
~. control of the pro-Roman Herod and Phaselus, his brother. 
Cassius soon Vlent to join Brutus in their final stand at 
Philippi. The anti-Roman Jews found a leader in Antigonus, 
son of Aristo bulus II, vTho endeavored to regain Judaea for 
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32. 
his 1"emily.53 His f"ather-in-lalll Ptolemy of Chalcis, who 
had regained much of the power taken away by Pompey, and 
Uarion, tyrant of Tyre, came to his support. They seized 
54 
three fortresees in Galilee. It V/aS Yli th affairs in 
this state ot" disorder that Antony took up his work of re-
organization. 
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CHAl?TER III. 
Antony's .?rovincial Adr:1inistration. 
Soon after ~he settlement at Philippi Antony set 
1 
out tor Greece. On his way he stopped at Thaeos 2 ~here 
the Libera~ors had located a depot of supplies3 and whither 
many ot the nobility had fled after the battle. An tlrranre-
ment 'I'!3.S made "7i th them rrhereby they delivered to Antony the 
money, arns, und su~pliec stared there. 4 
From Thasos Antony proceeded to Greece. Here he 
attended the various ca~e8 ~nd was initiated into the Eleu-
sinian mysteries. Plu~arch5 attributes his conduct in 
Greece to a mere love of pleasure and a passion for amuse-
mente There seeffiS to be a deeper reason, DleYl Octavian 
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1. llut. Ant. 23. No oiher source mentions this stop in 
Greece, but, since his conduct there, as Given by Plutarch, 
corresponds ~ith his policy in general, there is no reason 
to Goutt his st~y ~here. Garctthausen, II, 84, n. 6, accepts 
the stop in Greece, and offers as ~he reason Antony's well 
known love of Athens. 
2. It is curious ~hat r.'i th the e}.ception of Drumann, Geseht. 
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Vlorks. Appian, B.C. IV, 136, the only source, mentions it 
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3. Appian, B.C. IV, 106. 
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went into the East{22.3.C.) he visited Athens, where he also 
wa s initiated into the Eleusinian mysteries, and Sparta 
~here he partook of the tamous broth of the Syssitia. 6 Yet 
sentimental enthusiasm of any kind could never be assigned 
to Octavian and it" would be an exaggeration to call bim a 
Philhellene. 7 Surely he, as Antony bef"ore him, saw the 
value of such steps in influencing public opinion in the 
Greek citi e s of Asia ~inor. The Parthian kings tollowed 
t he same policy. It 'o'as because of" th e in:t"luential Greek 
citi e s 8 in their domain t hat t hey placed Philhellene as a 
t " 9 1tle on their coins. lluch 01° Antony's work lay in ASia 
~inor, where the Greek citie s with their abhorrence of 
every~hing which re s tricted the sovereign autonomy of each 
---000---
6. Arnold, Rom. Imp. p. 192 . 
7. Ibid; Ferrero, Greatness and Decline £1 Rome, V, p.7. 
8. Greek tovffiS in large numbers Vlere scattered throughout 
the empire. rtaw11nson, Parth. p. 88. Appian, Syr. 07-
58 names these cities. One of the most important vIas 
Seleucia. Plin. N.H. VI,30; Tac. Ann. VI,42; Appian, m.. 
57 M 11'10 di tl-jese cl"tl"es. • 'omr:,sen, Rom. Prov. p. scusses 1. -
-- ---" 
9. Head, lUst. Hum. pp.692-3. 
35. 
city-state created a problem for any power aspiring to rule 
10 Asia. Antony, therefore, entered into the various 
phases of Greek life not merely to gratify his own pleasure, 
but rather to become recognized as an enthusiastic Philhel-
11 lene. 
Greece. 
In this fact lies the importance of his stay in 
12 In the early spring Antony left Lucius Censor-
ius to continue the govern~ent of Greece13 and sailed for 
ASia, in all probability landing at Ephesus. 14 Josephus15 
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13. Lacedonia, Greece, anct Illyria seem to have been uni ted 
into one province known f"requently under the name of l1ace-
donia. Ganter, l!QY. Verw., p. 31, n.3.by elL. I, p.461 
shows tha t he had charge of Greece and Uacedonia,not Greece 
alone. Plut. Ant. 23. 
14. Chapot, l'rov. ]om., p. 13~.assumes from Appian, ~ 
V, 4, that he landed at Ephesus. 
15. Joseph. Antiq. Jud. XIV, 12,2. 
36. 
evidently supposes that Antony entered Asia by the northern 
land route, since he states that a commission of Je .... ys met 
16 Antony in Bithynia before he came to Ephesus. It seems 
more probable that ~he larger and more impor~ant delegation, 
composed of Herod and ~he prominent Jews of the Nationalist 
party \7hich met him in Bi thynia, vlould be preceded by the 
smaller delegation which brought him propitiatory gifts at 
Ephesus. Furthermore, in the decrees17 which Antony issued 
at the request of the 6.elegation which met him at Ephesus 
he mentions a former embassy to Rome, but does not mention 
a previous delegation to him in Bithynia. Therefore it 
seems better to place the delegation to Bithynia after that 
to Ephesus and as a consequence to conclude that Antony en-
tered ASia by the vlaY of Ephesus rather than by the vlaY of 
Bithynia. 
The fact that Antony would be compelled to trans-
port his troops to Asia by the northern route because of 
18 lack of ships would not have prevented his own visit to 
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16. Bouch~-Leclerq, Hist. Lag. II, p.233, n.3. 
17. Joseph. Antig. Jud. XIV, 12,3. 
18. Ganter, Prove ~. p. 33. 
37. 
Athens and Ephesus before rejoining his troops in ~he north. 
Furthermore .B."'phesus VJaS 
ASia,l~ where were kept 
ury of the province. 2l 
~he seat of the Roman proconsul in 
"'0 the public records~ and the treas-
Therefore, if Antony's visit to 
Athens is accepted, it is not illogical to conclude that he 
sailed from Athens to Ephesus as the most feasible place to 
22 bE3f~ 1n his work of reconstruction in Asia. 
Modern historians, placing full reliance on Plu-
tarch's stories of Antony's excesses while in ASia, lay 
great emphasis on the extravagant reception accorded to 
him on his arrival at Ephesus and see in his succeeding ac-
tions nothing of the proceedings of a Roman magistrate, but 
only the erratic conduct of a man given over to gratifying 
h 23 is 0\7n lusts and desires. It seems, however, that by 
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20. CIL. III, 6075, 6081, 6082; Chapot, Prove Rom. p. 138. 
21. CIL. III, 6077; Chapot, ~. Rom. p. 138. 
22. Chapot, Prove Rom. p. 138.states that so strong a 
pre cedent aro se tOor governors to en ter Asia at Ephe sus tl1a t 
Caracalla issued a decree to that effect. For a discus-
\. )), I 
sion of Ephesus as ~he kOl"1lo1l' nO"IG.S vide Chapot, ~. 
Born. pp. 454-467. 
23. 30uch~-Leclerq,~. Lag. II, p.232; Gardthausen, 
!ug. I, p. 183; Ferrero, Greatness and Decline of Rome, 
III, 227; Duruy, Hist. ~, III, p.615; Chapot, Prove Rom. 
P. 55. 
38. 
a careful culling from the stories of cooks, harpists, and 
courtesans those statements which, although given incident-
ally, point to~ .. :ard his general policy of administration, 
the conduct of Antony in the Orient can be shown to cor-
respond in a remarkable degree to the customary procedure 
of a Roman proconsul. 
Plutarch24 says that women met him dressed as 
Bacchae, men as Fauns and Satyrs~5 all addressing him as 
Dionysus in their songs. This enthusiastic reception as 
a means of winning the favor of the new governor vias usual, 
especially in the East, where the people, accustomed to a 
servitude which carried respect for a master almost to ad-
oration, made the governor the object of the most flatter-
26 ing and impressive demonstrations. To the Oriental 
mind the rela~ion between governing and governed was that 
27 28 between master and slave. Cicero bOasts of the crowds 
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24. Plut. Ant. 24. 
2ti. Vide Brown, The Great Dionysiac Myth, II, p.66,for the 
place of Satyrs in the TIorship of Dionysus. 
26. Person, Admin. Prove Rom. p. 273. 
27. Bevan, House of Seleucus, I, p.5. 
28. Cie. ad Att. V,13;14;20. 
39. 
29 
which met him even at Samos. There is extant an extra-
vagant decree of the ~phesians in honor of Caesar. 30 EVen 
Paul and Barnabas Vlere addressed as Jupiter and 1:Jercury on 
their entrance into Lycaonia. 3l 
Antony, on his part, offered a splendid sacrifice 
32 
to the city-goddess Artemis and doubled the area of sanc-
tity for the temple. 33 Here again censure has come to An-
tony for such a "reckless arrangement".34 Yet in earlier 
times A1e~ander had granted an extension of the right of 
asylum at Ephesus. Indeed to extend the privilege of 
Greek temples and xo make contributions to their enlarge-
ment TIas the easiest ITay for a ruler to demonstrate his use-
fulness to the Greek cities. 35 The prestige ana splendor 
---000---
29. D'Hugues,~. Rom. pp. 216-218. 
30. Judeich, Caesar im Orient, p. 62. 
31. Acts XIV, 11. 
32. Appian, ~ •• V,4. 
33. Strabo, XIV, 1,23. 
34. Arnold, Rom. Imp. p.232. 
35. Bevan, House of Seleucus, I, p.l09. Caesar also eave 
Antony precedent ,in that he enlarged the territory of the 
Comana and Zela priests. Judeich, Caesar im Orient, pp. 
117,156. 
40. 
ot the city sbrine brought \7orshippers and visitors, r:ho 
made the festivals popular, quickened trade and brought 
money to the city. To gain the good will of the cities 
similar concessions had oeen given by the various competi-
tors for power in Asia. These cities, aSide from com-
mercial reasons, considered it advantageous to have large 
sacred asylums in that this was a guarantee against devas-
36 
tation in time of war. Furthermore the influence of 
the priests at the head of such largely endowed sanctuar-
ies must not be underestimated. Since the lycians Vlere 
lacking in laree city buildings they assembled in the tem-
pIes to discuss pUblic affairs, often with the priest pre-
siding. ~lerefore the Greeks, although usually intoler-
ant ot· priestly supremacy, :found the cult of Artemis use-
ful as a fusion of Oriental and Hellenistic ideas. 37 The 
immense sacerdotal interests ,,'h1ch haa developed here were 
38 
too strong to be treated aisrespectfully even by Octavian. 
---000---
36. Chapot, Prove Rom. p. 40. 
37. Ibid. p. 3~8. 
38. Arnold, Rom. Imp. p. 232. 
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Accordingly it seems that Antony had ample reason for his 
action in the influence he viould thus gain at Ephesus. 
In criticizing Antony ~or increasing the area of 
sancti ty it has been held that this right increased lav/less-
ness by rurnishing a place of re~uge ~or criminals. It 
must be rerr.emberedthat the Roman conception o~ the right of 
asylum dirfered from that of the Greeks in that it took lit-
tIe account oi' the religious sentiment 'r.rhen it came into 
contact 17i th the proper punishment oi' evil-doers and crimi-
nals. The right of asylum VlaS limi ted to temporary pro-
tection until t'ormal trial could be made ano judgmen t based 
on evidence could be riven. In this \'fay it became an aid 
39 
rather than a hindrance to criminal procedure. 
That Antony held the Roman rather than the Orien-
tal vie-;; o:f sactuary is shovm by the i'act that, 0 f those 
re:t'ugees 1':ho had fled to the temple after the de1'eat of 
Brutus and CassiUS, he rei'used pardon to Petronius v/ho had 
taken part in the murder of Caesar and to Quintus \'rho had 
b C L 'i 40 L etrayed Dolabella to assius at aoa cea. oyalty to 
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40. Appian, B.C. V,4l; Chapot, ~. Rom. p.407. 
42. 
the government vIas a concli tion essential to the recogni-
41 
tion of the right of sanctuary. This fact, rather than 
the influence of Cleopatra, explains the execution of Ar-
sinoe vJhen she YlaS a suppliant at the temple of Artemis. 42 
In a comparison of Antony's work in the Orient 
wi "th that of a Roman proconsul, it is necessary to keep in 
mind the absolute power of a governor in his province. Un-
der the republic there was placed a"t "the head of each prov-
ince a magistrate, sometimes a consul or praetor, more 
43 
often a proconsul or a proprae"tor. From the day when 
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41. Chapot, Prove rlom. p. 407. 
42. Appian, B.C. V,g, states that she VIas killed at Miletus; 
Joseph. Antig. Jud. XV, 4, at Ephesus. Dio XLVIII, 24, says 
~ / 
u.Se-A<J,oo s. . Gardthausen, Aug. II, p. e6, n.1S, suggests that 
Dio ViaS thinking of "the 1°alse Ptolemy, \O,ho called himself" a 
orother of Cleopatra and v.~ho ViaS given into Antony's pm'rer. 
Chapot, referring to Mommsen's Strafrecht, p. 460, n.l,says 
that the Romans may have considered the right of asylum a 
hindrance only to the local authorities. He explains An-
tony's action accordingly. 
43. Chapot, Prove Rom. p. 2~2,discusses "the various ap-
pOintments of these magistrates. 
43. 
he received the office from the hands of his predecessor 
hi s au thori ty ViaS supreme. As far as the province was 
concerned, he was an absolute dictator who had every power 
over it and over whom it had no pov,'er. As f"ar as Rome 
was concerned he ViaS practically independent. No one 
could force him to resign or prescribe his line of conduct. 
In his province he was the equal of the consul at Rome. 
Like him he had his lictors and all the appurtenanoes of 
public authority. In reality he was more powerful than 
the consul, for he was not hampered by the senate, tribunes, 
in 
and censors. An unscrupulous governor could unite~his own 
authority the powers of most of the magistrates of the 
44 
oap1 tal. 
The first duty of a governor was to issue an 
edict which set forth the rules and re{!ulations of law 
and equity that he intended to follow in the exercise of 
45 his jurisdiction. The ediot consisted of two parts. 
In the first division were the affairs which vlere proper-
ly within the jurisdiction of the governor, such as the ac-
counts of the cities, their debts, the rate of interest, 
and all matters pertaining to the collection of taxes. 
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44. Person, Admin. ~. Rom. p.366. 
45. Ibid. pp. 270-3; Arnold, Rom. Erov. Admin. p.54; 
D'Hugues, Erov. ~. p. 298, Cic., ad A tt. Vl.,l.,g1 ves 
a summary of his edict. 
44. 
In the second division TIere matters which would be decided 
according to the edict and for y!hich the edict had to pro-
vide, such as wills, acquisitions, and mortgages. 46 For 
matters not treated in the edict the governor formally re-
ferred to the edicts of his predecessors "Thich formed a 
legal code in themselves, the edictum tralaticium. 47 r.'hile 
ttere is no mention of Antony's issuing an edict as such, 
he did summon to ~n assembly at Ephesus the peoples of the 
surrounding territory, as TIas customary, and delivered to 
them an address corresponding in part to the first division 
of a fovernor's edict in that it was a statement of his 
policy, of tbe levies expected i'rom these peoples, and the 
48 
time OI payr:lent. It is probable that such matters as 
nere usually taken up in the second part of the edict Vlcre 
included in a formal publication, but Appian r!ould scarcely 
incorporate such material into a speech even if he had the 
sQurce material for so doing. 
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46. Person, Admin. Prove Rom. pp.270-273, 
47. Arnold, Rom. Prove Admin. p.55; Cic. Q£!11. V,2l; ad 
~. III, 8,4. 
48. Appian, B.C. V, 4-5. 
45. 
As soon as possible afte~ issuing his edict the 
~overnor began a tour of his province,49 holding court at 
the towns set apart as convenien"t centers in \'lhich he VIas 
accustomed to stop and hold court. 50 For convenience the 
provinces 'were divided into conventus luridici. 51 Pliny52 
enumerates the conventus of· the provinces after the reorg-
anization by Agrippa, na~ing the important cities of each. 53 
In planning his rout e the governor included so t·ar as vms 
possi ble "these cities, out 1 t \'la S b~' no me ans necessary to 
visit each one. Cicer054 carried on "the greater part of 
his judicial work in Laodicea where cases were tried from 
the districts of Cibyra, Apamea, Synada, Pamphylia, Lyca-
onla and Isauria. 
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49. Arnold, Rom. Prov. Admin. p.59; Chapot, Prov. Rom. 
p. 352; Person, Admin. Prov. Rom. p. ~78. 
50. Cic. 1£ Verr. V,ll. 
51. Strabo, XIII, 4,12; Cic. !!£ Fam. XIII, 67, ,'!here he 
uses the Greek tern; ~ Fam III, 8. n11ere he uses "the 
latinized dioecesis. 
5" ITHV "I-:, 1:,. _'1_. _ •.• G.; sq. He mentions Laouicaea, Synnada, Apamea, 
Alabanda, Sardis, Smyrna, Ephesus, Adramyttium ane Pergamum. 
b3. Vide Chapot, E!Qy. B£ill. pp. 351-358 for a discussion of 
the conventus iurdici. 
54. ad Att. V,2l. Cicero's province consisted OfC:ilicia. 
46. 
Antony set out on such a tour as soon as his 
55 work a"t J!.'phesus was comple"ted. In a discussion of "this 
tour i"t mus"t be remembered that Antony's nork did not lie 
in one province alone, but included the adminis"tration of 
all territory in "the Orient dominated by Rome. ApPian56 
gives the only definite s"tatement of the districts included 
in Antony's tour. He states that Phrygia, Mysia, Cappa-
docia, Cilicia, Coele-Syria, Palestine, Iturea, and the 
other provinces of Syria were included. Josephus includes 
U· h 57 
.Jl.t ynia. A conjec"tural route ",ould pass through Ephe-
sus, Smyrna, Sardis, Magnesia, Pergamon, Adramyttium, Cy-
zicus, Nicaea, Ancyra, Pessinum, Synnada, Iconium, Cybis-
tra, Tyana, Tarsus, Antioch, Laoaicea, Apamea, Epiphania, 
from wi1ich a cavalry expedition was sent to Palmyra, Damas-
cus, through Iturea, across Palestine to "the coas"tand 
thence to Egypt. 
On his tour it ~as the duty of "the governor to 
attend to the repair ana maintenance of all public build-
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Aspera and Campestris, Pisidia, Isauria,ALycaonia. To 
these had been "temporarily added three "dioceses" in Phrypia -
LaOdicea, Apamea, and Synada, and the Islanc of Cyprus. Vide 
Shuckburg, Introduction "to Let"ters of Cicero, Vol. II, p. IX. 
55. Appian, B.C. V,7. 
56. Ibid. 
57. Antig. Jud. XIV, 12,2. 
47. 
ings, roads and fortifications. 58 Accordingly, ~hile in 
Greece,Antony made rich gifts to Athens, ordered that re-
pairs be made on the senate-house at hlegara and that the 
temple of PythianApollo be surveyed preparatory to certain 
additions. 59 ~hile on his tour of the East he gave relief 
to the cities Which had suffered devastation during the 
civil rrars,60 established a gymnasium at Tarsus,til and 
62 
ordered the rebuilding of Xanthus. 
In his military capacity the governor directed 
that leVies be made 63 and could in case of need callout 
any veterans who might be living in the province. 64 An-
tony incorporated the garrisons of the country around 
Apamea into his ovm forces and assigned them to garrison 
duty in Syria because they knevl the country. 65 For naval 
CG purposes he oraered tV10 hundred ships to bebuil t and manned. 
It was, however, in the capaci ty ot" supreme judge 
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59. Plut. Ant. 23. 60. Appian, B.C. V,7. 
61. Strabo, XIV, 5,14. 62. Appian, B.C. V, 7. 
63. ~. Alex. 50. 64. Cia. ad Att. V,18. 
65. Dio, XLVIII, 25. 66. Appian, B.C. "1,55; Plut. 
Ant. 30. 
48. 
that the proconsul impressed himself most strongly upon the 
i - f" h . i 1 67 Alth h th . m nas 0 t e provlnc a s. oug e lnclination of 
the governor largely decided the extent of his authority,68 
in the performance of his judicial function the governor was 
endowed with absolute power, fo~, , in theory, the province 
69 was perpetually under martial law. 
There are but few rererences in the sources to 
actual judicial ,",'ork on Antony's part wi th the exception of 
dynastic disputes. Plutarch states first that Antony's 
70 judicial decisions at Athens were just and equitable, 
secondly" that when Cleopatra arrived at Tarsus Antony was 
seated in the tribunal '::i th the people assembled bet"ore him 
71 in the agora, and thirdly that frequently when he was ad-
ministering justice to tetrarchs and kings on his tribunal, 
he would receive from Cleopatra love letters written on 
onyx or crystal and read them. 72 It is therefore to be 
assumed that he held court in the important tovms on his 
tour. 
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68. Ibid. p.61. 69. Ibid. p.62. 
70. Ant. 23. 71. Ibid. 26. 
72. Ibid. 58. 
49. 
In case of quarrels between cities, tribes or 
contestants to . ~ throne the governor was frequently called 
in as arbitrator. 73 When he felt that he was not in a po-
sition to settle such questions he referred the case to 
-q • • 74 
.... ome t"or lnstructlon. Gicero was called upon to settle 
a dispute between Ariarathes and his brother Ariobarzanes. 75 
A 76 ntony likewise judged between rival claimants to thrones. 
Among such cases "TaS the dispute betv!een Ariara thes and 
77 Archelaus (Sisena). 
Apl;ian attributes Antony's award of the kingdom 
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73. Person, Admin. Prove Rom. p.278. 
74. Ibid. p.279. 
75. Cic. ad Fam. XV,2; ad Att. V,20; ad Fam. XV,4. 
76. Appian, B.D. V,7; Plut. Ant. 24. 
77. Appian, B.C. V,7 places this decision in the year 41; 
Dio XLIX,32,in the year 36; Val.~. IX,15,2,gives no date; 
Tac. Ann. II,42,in 34. Since Tacitus states that the de-
cision took place 50 years before 16 A.D. Gardthausen, Aug. 
II, p.185, n.1£,says that Tacitus \'TaS using round numbers 
and did not contradict Dio. He says that Ariarathes ruled 
from 42 to 36 and struck coins as king during that period. 
(Head, Hist. Num. p. 633). Niese (article in Pauly-i'/issowa 
under Ariarathes) states a preference for 41 without enter-
ing into the discussion. It seems prooaole that Antony 
made the decision in favor of Archelaus in 41, out did not 
50. 
to Archelaus in preference to Ariarathes to the influence 
78 
o:t his beauti!'ul mother Glaphyra. Consequently modern 
historians cite this as an instance of Antony's favoritism 
, 79 
ana caprlce. ',.hen the rela"Lionship between Archelaus 
and Herod is recalled, a dirrerent light is thrown on the 
situation. Archelaus vas exceedingly friendly with Eerod. eO 
His daughter, Glaphyra, married Herod's son, Alexander. 
Ariarathes had had constant trouble in Daintaining his 
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eni'orce it un til 36 rrhen he \'laS again taking up such rna t-
terse Hence I put the decision in 41. This explanation 
Dould eliminate the seeming contradiction in Appian and Dio. 
78. B.C. V,7. It is amusing to note that Plutarch, Ant. 58 
inSists th-:l"t Antony \" as so int'stuated r'ith Cleopatra et 
this time that he ~ould interrupt the procedure or such 
cases to read her love letters. 
79. }'errero, Greatness and Decline of ~~orne, III, p.390; 
Bouch~-Leclerq, Hist. Lac. II, p.233; Gardthausen, Augustus, 
I, p.2'J2; Drun1ann, Gescilt. l:oms. I, p.3<;JO. L:artial XI, 20 
lends weight to this opinion. 
eo. Joseph. Antiq. Jud. XVI, e,G. 
51. 
position in Cappadocia. Although a portion of lesser Ar-
menia had been assigned to him by Caesar in 47 B.C.,81 not 
a foot of his possessions remained in his power by 45 B.C., 
when he came to Rome to attempt to buy a kingdom ot· Caesar.82 
In the time of Cicero's proconsulship he had been party to 
a conspiracy to win the power from his brother Ariobarzanes, 
who was under the special protection of Rome. 83 On the 
other hand Archelaus had proved himself a most efficient 
rUler. Later Octavian also recognizing his ability, not 
only confirmed him in his power but also gave him Cilicia 
with the difficult task of overcoming piracy. He ruled 
84 from 36 B. C. to 17 A.D. Since Cappadocia ViaS a region 
which it was essential for .the Romans to hold in case of a 
Parthian invasion,85 in the choic~ between these men Antony 
seems to have been influenced by the ability of the man to 
render him effective assistance rather than by the wiles of 
the charming Glaphyra. This is the first instance of An-
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52. 
tony's use of a policy vhich he maintained throughout his 
entire a6ministration of the Orient, the appointment of 
pro-Roma:1. no. ti ve princes to the thrones oi' border kingdorls 
to protect the Roman interests. Their territory became 
buffer states against the po~er of Parthia. Caesar had 
adopted the same policy at·te:;- the battle of Zela. 86 Oc-
tavian continued the policy. He surrounded the Euphrates 
frontier wi th a series of states uhich acknovlledged ROI:1an 
influence as supreme by accepting princes of his appoint-
87 
ment. 
Antony also showed e~cellent judgment in his 
deal ings l"i th the J e17S. It has already been suggested that 
'I"!hile he \'ras in Ephesus embassadors had corne to him from Hyr~ 
canus bringing a [;olden crown and requesting that ho command 
that those Je,'ls be set free r.~ho had been carried array into 
captivity by Cassius, and that the country that Cassius had 
taken away from the Jews be restored. The request 1;las 
granted,and. deorees Here sent to the Tyrians, Sidonians, 
Antiochians, and Aradians, commanding any property taken from 
the Jews in the time of Cassius to be restored and all Jews 
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86. Bell. Alex. 78; Judeich, Caesar im Orient, pp. 14~-159. 
8'_ Arnold, Rom. Imp. p. ~13. 
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sold by him as slaves to be rreed~ 
53. 
A secor..d de.putation came to Antony in Bithynia. 
Thi s delegation represented the lint ional ist p3r ty, nho ae:ain 
had hopes of the downfall of' the Idumeans since t1::ey had but 
l a tel:y- [i ven t heir t'ull support "to the Liberators. They 
had ~omp lained to Antony that although Hyreanus had the 
nOr.linal autbority, in reality Herod and Phaselus held the 
pO'.7er. T.J ' Heroa, '·.'ho ap:reared in his orm der'ence, had not 
been trained in the 20man methods in vain. 89 Josephus 
states th a t because of bribes~O Antony paid great respect 
to Herod and that his adversaries obtained no hearing. It 
is probable ttat Antony \'!ell remembered the prO-1?arthian 
proclivities of ~erodrs opponents of the liasmonean house 
and the loyal sUFfort ':;hieh the Idumeans haa alvlays given 
Rom ~.:m interests \":l'letl:er of one political faction or of an-
other; eonseque~tly he felt fully justified in refusing to 
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and tI::e letter to H;vrcanus are fiven in full. 
8~. Ibid. XIV, 12, 2. 
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54. 
hear the nationalists. This ViaS not an unusual procedure 
91 
on the part of the governor. Cicero takes great credit 
to himself because he had not been so difficult of access 
to ambassadors as former governors, but he says that even 
he sometimes refused to grant a hearing. 92 
93 
\'/hen Antony came to Antioch, a delegation of 
one hundred promient Jews met him to aocuse Herod and the 
94 
Idumeans of misgovernment. A oertain Messala spoke in 
refutation of the charges. The hearing was held at Daphne
95 
in the presence of Hyrcanus. By an appeal to Hyrcanus to 
state which party ruled most beneficially for the people, 
Antony compelled him to ally himself openly VIi th one party 
or the other. He took his stand with the pro-Romans. As 
. 96 
a result Antony appointed Herod and Phaselus tetrarchs. 
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93. It is interesting to note that neit~er Caesar nor An-
tony carried on negotiations with the Jews in Judaea. 
94. Probably M. Valerius Messala, distinguished in both 
politics ana letters. At this time he was a partisan of 
Antony. Vide Smith, .ill:.£!. of Gk. ~ Rom. Biog. p. 1051. 
95. A pleasure ground about five miles from Antioch. Vide 
l.Iommsen Rom. Prove II, pp.140-l41. 
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tetrarohate such as was usual among the Galatians, was later 
55. 
By this appointment they beoame independent allied 
princes with fUll political powers, but in rank inferior 
to a king. Hyroanus retained, as under Pompey, the 
power of high priest alone. A sUbsequent embassy of a 
thousand Jews oame to Antony at Tyre to try to pursuade 
him to ohange his decision. Admittanoe to Antony was re-
fused and a riot ensued in whioh several Jews were killed 
and others arrested. The outraged people arose against 
Herod and in retaliation Antony put the prisoners to death. 
For the time being the Nationalist ,party was foroed to 
submit to the rule of the Idumeans. 
This oourse seems rather aroitrary on Antony's 
part, out in passing judgment it is neoessary to keep in 
mind the importance of the loyalty of Judaea to Roman in-
terests. At the beginning of the present war Lord Cromer, 
late vioeroy of Egypt, hastened to point out the faot that 
Palestine is likely to prove one of the most important 
buffer states after the war, both beoause it borders on 
the Suez oanal the present great trade route from the East, 
and because it also borders on Egypt, the great souroe of 
the grain supply. Practically the same condi tions, \'li th 
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inferior to a king. Cf Mommsen, Rom. l!£!. II, p. 192, 
n. 1; Joseph. Antig. Jud. XIV, 13,1. 
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the order of importance reversed, were true in the time 
of Herod. Furthermore defection in Judaea threatened the 
very existence of the Eastern Empire by opening the fron-
tier to the parthians. 97 
Antony has also been criticized for his treatment 
o~ the Syrian princes. It has been shovm that the reor-
ganization of Syria under Pompey had been more nominal than 
real and that during the civil wars the deposed princes had 
profited by the general disorganization. The Parthians, 
as usual, had been of great assistance to them. 98
 On An-
tony's advance into Syria he overthrew the rule of these 
princes and attempted to re~stablish the power of Rome, as 
Pompey had aone. By this step he hastened the inevitable 
conflict with Parthia, as these client princes of Par-
thia, for such they really were, fled thither for protec-
tion. 99 
It seems that, in Antony's dealings with the poli-
tical questions arising in the Orient, he followed the prec-
edent set by Pompey, Cicero, and Caesar in placing in power 
those claimants to the throne who could most ably maintain 
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and protect the interests of Rome. In his cburse of ac-
tion he followed the regular proceedings of a Roman pro-
consul. He landed at Ephesus. he received the usual 
flattering demonstration of the people on his arrival. he 
issued a i 'orm of edict, he made a tour of the provinces. 
stopping at the most important cities to hold court, he 
repaired and constructed public buildings. he provided i'or 
naval and land forces, and he decided dynastic disputes. 
Regarding those matters which were outside ~he 
province of a Roman proconsul, such as the granting of 
freedom to cities, it will be necessary to compare his 
course of action with that of Caesar and Octavian. Af-
ter the Uithridatic war. Sulla inaugurated a system of re-
warding cities which had shown their loyalty to the Roman 
government by granting them libertas. lOO Although the 
practice was gradually discontinued until it was praatic-
101 
ally abolished under the early emperors, freedom was 
granted to certain cities by Caesar and Oatavian as well 
102 
as by Antony. Caesar gave freedom to Amisus, Apamea. l03 
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Cnidus,104 Aphrodias,105 Ilium,106 Antiochus Epidaphnis,l07 
and confirmed the freedom of Rhodes. l08 
Antony freed Laodicea,109 Tarsus ,110 and Herac-
1e~lll and confirmed the freedom of Se1eucia in Cilicia 112 , 
and of Tyre,l13 Sidonl14 and Aphrodiasl15 while he deprived 
of freedom Amisus l16 and Antiooh of Pisidia. 117 
Octavian, following the same policy, granted free-
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dom to Samos,118 hlytilene,119 and Ilium. He confirmed 
the freedom of Stratonicea. 120 He deprived of freedom, 
usually because of lack of loyalty to Roman interests, Cher-
121 122 
sonesus Heraclea, Cyzicus for a period of five years, 
Tyre,123 and Sidon. 124 The freedom of Astypale was dis-
continued for a period.125• 
Antony then in granting freedom to some cities 
as a reward for loyalty to his cause was but pursuing a 
policy already established. Likewise he was in full ac-
cord with a tendency followed by his successors when for 
various political reasons he deprived other cities of their 
freedom. 
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He has been severely censured by both ancient 
and modern historians for the important part ,,!hich the in-
fluence of his friends played in his administration. 126 
Yet, even a cursory reading of Cicero's letters shows the 
insurmountable difficulty nhich that conscientious states-
man met vrith in attempting to maintain an impartial govern-
ment. r,'hen a man became a provincial governor he paid 
127 
off all his obligations to his friends. ITe received 
requests or all kinds varying from Obtaining panthers for 
the shows128 to preventing the trial of a friend's friend's 
h . 1 129 mot er-ln- aWe Even the "noble Brutus" felt that a 
friend's interests Vlere of more importance than the rights 
of the provincials. 130 Therefore Antony ViaS only follow-
ing a precedent already set, when he appointed his favor-
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. 131 ites to offlce. To the great expense caused by the 
132 
extravagence of Antony's staff a parallel can be found 
in that of the average Roman governor's attendants. Ci-
133 
cero tells of the amazement of the people at the ad-
mirable character of his staff, but even Cicero was forced 
to admit that not all 01' the members cont'ormed to his re-
quest that they be of no expense to the provincials. 134 
In thus outlining Antony's work in the Orient , 
the purpose has not been to defend his personal life, but 
to point out that his general policy in the Orient corres-
ponded in a large measure to that of the average Roman 
governor. His whole course of action pOints toward the 
foundation of a strong provincial government patterned 
upon the precedent of those v,ho bad preceded him and con-
tinued oy his astute successor, not to the establishment 
of a great empire for himself, for Antony after all VIas 
but a "first rate second rate" man. 
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CHAPTER IV. 
Antony in Egypt. 
There no'"" arises the quest-ion as to Antony's 
purpose in spending the winter in Ale:xandria rather than 
in the further administration of provincial at·f'airs in 
Asia ~inor ana Syria. 1"/1 th his ,·!ork there \"Tell under 
'.:laY, but by no means completed, he hastened to Egypt, 
leaving Syria especially in a state of unrest. The 
people ~ere ready to respond to the first incentives to 
revolt found in t,ne Parthian incursions of the rollo\"!ing 
spring. 
Antony lackeQ patience and t,he ability for care-
ful and painstaking vlork. Big enterprises appealed to 
him, but the t,edious labor involved in the actual accom-
plishn:en t of these undert,akings VlaS irksome. The t"irst 
step in Caesar's plans, whether of Oriental conquest or 
for the security of the provinc;es, VlaS, in all pro babili ty, 
the reorganizat,ion or Asia Uinor and Syria so t,hat he 
'could rely upon that region as a secure base of supplies 
in his rear. Antony tad set to vlork to carry out t,his 
reorganization with his usual energy and despatch, but 
vlhen his i·irst enthusiasm began to wane, when the assigning 
or kingcoms, t,he hearing of embassies, the levying of tri-
bute, and t,he settling of disputes between t,he petty 
princes TIas over, he \"las ready t,o begin the second step 
ratner than t,o complet,e what promised to be a tedious task, 
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the establishment OI these Iirst larger and more in~erest-
ing measures on a Iirm founda~ion. 
If Antony was ~o establish the supremacy of Rome 
in the Orient, a su~cessful raid into Parthian ~erritory 
was essen~ia1 to offset the prestige ga1ned by the Parthians 
from the de~eat of Crassus; but, as Caesar,his own general 
had said, "There can be no army without money".l 
Therefore, the seoond step in Antony's establishment of the 
power of Rome was ~he Iinanoing OI the expedition against 
lar~hia. Antony had not ~ound Asia the lucrative source 
or revenue which he had hoped. From the time of Pompey 
Asia had Deen drained of money by constant and exorbitant 
levies and exactions until the country had come to a state 
of financial exhaustion not at first appreciated by the tri-
UlDvirs. 
Egypt, on the contrary, was still abOunding in 
riches. It was the only important state of the Eastern 
liedi terranean which ViaS nominally independent. The Ptol-
emies possessed great and unexhausted treasure. Antony 
must have nad all this in mind when he sent for Cleopatra 
to meet him at Tarsus. In light OI these oonditions the 
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meeting at Tarsus is shorn o~ all the romantic glamor 
which has been so emphasized throughout the ages and be-
comes a political move on the part of both Antony and 
Cleopatra. The woman at the head of Egypt was the clev-
erest of a line of clever women. The Macedonian Cleopa-
tra, as the Cleopatras and Arsinoes before her, had aims 
and ambitions of her own in the accomplishment of 'Vlhioh 
she VlaS ready to use the same unscrupulous means. The 
Macedonianblood and tradition showed clearly in the 
character of the Ptolemaic queens. These women plotted 
ann intrigued for power as did the queens of the old Maoe-
nonian line. Arsinoe II married first the king o~ Thrace. 
On his murder by her half-brother Keraunos, she married 
Keraunos, while for a third husband lJhe won her ovm brother 
after disposing of her step-daugnter (perhaps her own 
2 daughter) to whom he was already married. The stories 
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o~ the marriages of Cleopatra II and III are even more 
harroVling, if we can accept Justin. 3 Can it be wondered 
that Cleopatra adopted as a means to establish her power 
first an intrigue with Caesar and then a marriage with 
4 Antony? "The last Cleopatra is the best known of her 
line, but she is only a type of her olass. 
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parent only. Here the Egyptian social laws permitted 
Vlha t '\']Ould be impossi ble in any modern ci viIi za tion. The 
marriage of a brother and a sister was the marriage par 
excellence, and it contracted an unspeakable sanctity 
when this brother and sister were born of parents who 
" stood in the same relation. Ptolemy II was the first 
1.1acedonian to make this concession to the Egyptian tradi-
tion, a conceseion which was adopted by his successors. 
3. Vide Mahaffy, Hist. Egypt, for a discussion of this 
point. 
4. Polygamy was common among all the successors of 
Alexander as well as in the earlier MaceO-onian oourt. 
Cf. Mahaffy, Gk. Life ~ Thought, p.23; Hist. EgYpt, 
p. 76. 
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no relegation of queens to the obscurity of the harem. 
They mingled in the political game as freely as men. It 
was indeed in the political sphere rather than in that of 
sensual indulgence that their passion lay ana their crimes 
Cleopatra was determined that Egypt 
should not meet the f'ate vlhich had overtaken the other 
kingdoms of the East, incorporation in the Roman Empire. 
The splendor' and magnificenoe displayed on her journey 
to Cilicia was not the mere gratifioation of vanity, a 
. vroman's foolish v/him. ~very detail was planned to im-
press the ooserver wi th the evidence of unlimi ted vleal the 
Antony needed money. Cleopatra needed Antony. 
Cleopatra was too perfect a mistress of the art 
or intrigue not to know that undue haste in unfolding her 
design of a great empire in Egypt WOUld be fatal to her 
sucoess. Cleopatra had many enemies among the upper 
class who ITere bitterly opposed to her rule. 6 It must 
be remembered that the ptolemles '''ere not native Egyp-
tians but hlacedonians, who, like the other kings of the 
Hellenio East, were bid ding f'or Roman lavor and dreading 
Roman wrath. There were never any national uprisings 
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in favor of these sovereigns for they made but 1i~t1e ef-
• 
fort to inspire loyalty in their native SUbjects. 7 It 
may have Deen with a pretext of establishing her power 
against them that she asked Antony to. come to Egypt, where, 
on his part, he hoped to obtain the funds necessary for his 
!'ur~her vlork. Consequently, in the autumn of 41 B.C. An-
tonY.· left Syria to spend the winter months in Alexandria. 
Much emphasis has been laid by the anoient his-
torians on the faot ~hat, on Antony's entrance into Alex-
andria, he laid aside the insignia of his office. They 
assQ~e tnat he intended this act to be emblematic of his 
putting aside the cares and duties of a general and ~r~t 
he regarded his wintering in Egypt as a festal oocasion.
8 
One needs only to look back at the entranoe of Caesar in-
to Alexandr1a~ to realize the wisdom of Antony's step. 
Caesar entered Eeypt in i·ull regalia Of: 'office. It seems 
strange, perhaps, that the populace of Alexandria, so ac-
---000---
7. Cf. Mahaffy, EmP. Ptol., p. 341. 
8. Appian, B.C. V, 11. Appian says it might also have 
been because he pas in foreign jurisdiction. This 1s a 
more probable reason. 
9. Dio, XLII, 7; L~oan, ~. IX, 1007; Liv. ~.,CXLI; 
Frontin, Strateg. I, 1,6; Caes. B.C. III, 106; Appian, 
B.C. II 89- for a discussion of Caesar's lanaing vide 
- , , 
Judeich Caesar im Orient, p. 78sq. 
, - .;..;;.----
68. 
customed ~o the pomp and ceremony of the royal court, 
shoula ~ake offence at this. The large Roman element 
in the mob at Alexandria and the effect of sucn a pro-
cedure on them must be taken into account. 
Caesar himself describes ~he composition of ~he 
forces ,-rhicn so nearly det'ea ted him at Alexanaria. "There 
were soldiers of Gabinius who had accustomea ~hemselves 
to Alexandrian life and license, haa forgotten the name 
and discipline of the Roman people,and had married Egyp-
tian wives oy whom very mnny of them haa haa children. 
To these Vlere aaaed men collected t'rom among ~he free-
booters and brigands of Syria, of Cilicia, ana of the 
neighooring regions. Many condemned criminals ana exiles 
haa joined them. All our ovm fugi ti ve slave s haa a sure 
place of refuge at Alexandria. Assurance of their lives 
was given them on their being enrolled in ~he army. If 
any one of them 'VIas arrested oy .his ovmer he ,(lOuld be res-
cued oy the common consent of the soldiery, wno repelled 
violence done to their comrades as a peril to themselves 
• 
since ~hey Vlere all alike involved in Similar gUilt." 10 
"eaee constabant ex Gabinianis 'miltibus, qUi iam in con-
suetuainem Alexanarinae vitae ac licentiae venerant et 
nomen aisciplinqmque populi Romani dedidicerant Uxores-
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Ciliciaeque provinciae finitimarumque reg1onum; multi 
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praeterea capitis aamnati exsulesque convenerant. Fugi-
tivis omnLbus nostris certus erat Alexandriae receptus 
certaque vitae conaicio, utdato nomine mi1itum essent 
numero; quorum si quis a domino prehenderetur, consensu 
militum eripiebatur qUi vim suorum, quod in s1mi1! culpa 
versabantur, ipsi pro suo periculo defoendebant." These 
Romans Iully understood the significance of the fasces. 
The appearance of a Roman fenera1 in full insignia of of-
fOice meant the probable loss of their much cherished free-
11 dam. The A1eYandrian mob was a pouer that had to be 
reckoned 1'°1 the "The people of Alexandria spoke the voice 
of Egypt more completely tl:an Paris does of France.,,12 
These mercenary troops had lived in close relation to the 
court and bad assumed or drifted into the prerogatives and 
13 
dignities of the old ~acedonian household troops. Ac-
---000---
11. ~f. 1i.omr.lsen, Rom. Hist. Vol. IV, p. 511; 1ill.haffy, 
~. Egypt, p. 239sq. 
12. LIahaffy, EmP. ~. p. 333. 
13. 11ahaffy,~. Egypt, p. 241. 
70. 
cording ~o Caesar14 they had been in the habit of demand-
ing the execution of fOriends of the royal !'amily, of plun-
dering the property of the wealthy, of besieging the kings' 
palaces ~o secure more pay, of driving one man from the 
throne ana summoning another to fill it, a~ter the ancient 
custom of the Alexandrian army. 
It must be remembered too that Alexandria \7aS no 
more a typical Greek ci~y than an Oriental one. It lacked 
those all essential parts of a polis, the boule and the 
demos. In ~he great mass of papyri that have come dovm 
from Egypt ~here is . . no\"lhere any indication that a Senate 
15 met or that the people assembled. In place of an as-
sembly in Alexandria was the soldiery backed by the great 
mob whose inf'luence in disturbed times increased to des-
potism.lt> 
Antony profitedDy the knowledge gained both 
. . 
from his stay in Egypt with Gabinius and 1'rom the £ixperi-
ence of Caesar. During his entire stay in Alexandria, he 
made every effort to gain the favor of the populace. Of-
ten at night both he and Cleopatra TIould sally forth in 
servant's disguise and mingle among the crowd vrhere they 
were often recognized. The Ale~andrians took delight in 
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his extravagances and joined in his frolics, saying that 
1;hey were thankful to An1;ony for playing his tragic roles 
for the Romans and keeping his comedy for 1;hem. 17 
~~i1e the-lower stra1;um of the Alexandrian pop-
18 
ula1;ion consisted in a large part of natives, Alexan-
dria was primarily a Greek city, founded by Alexander for 
the Greeks. 19 The selection of a site in a remote corner 
.. 
of' the delta indicated clearly his intention of making 
this Hellenic ci 1;y ':,hich \'Tas to dominate Egypt as free 
as possi ble from Egyp1;ian influence. 20 The 1.J:acedonians 
!'ormed a specially privileged group. Just vlhat these 
privileges were is uncertain but they probably lay chief-
21 ly in fiscal exemptions. The pto1emies had rul1y car-
22 
ried out Aristotle's uords to Alexander, when he advised 
him to be a leader of the lle11enes and a master of the 
---000---
17. Plut.~. 29. 
18. Mommsen, Rom. Prove II, p. 287; llahaffy, ~. Egypt. 
p. 10. 
19. Jus1;. 11,2. 
20. i'iiegal1, Life and Times E.1 Cleopatra, p. 19. 
21. Radin, ~ among~. and Roms., p.l08,for a further 
d.iscussion. 
22. l.~urra~T, Ancient Gk. 1i t., p. 374. 
72. 
baroarians, to provide for the former as friends and to 
use tbe latter as plants and animals. 23 
. 
Antony did not r"ail to recornize the importance 
of the Greeks • Again he appears as Philhellene. He 
spent much time ~ith the Greeks. He wore their square-cut 
garment and the vrhi te Attic shoe ot" the Athenian and Alexan-
24 drian priests. 
Lahaft"y has sbov!l1 from a study of the papyri of 
the mi ddle 0:[ 1)he third century B. C. that Je~'lish settle-
25 
ments haa existed for many years in Egypt. There can 
be little doubt tr..a t Je ..... ls v/ere found in all classes from 
the hifhly privileged 1lacedoniruls to the lowest slaves. 26 
Here as in Judaea it r laS the tendency ot' the \7ealthy class 
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27 to become comple~ely H~enized. Antony's friendship 
with this element in Judaea must have been reqognized by 
the Egyptian Jews. In the popularity won by Antony dur-
ing his stay in Alexandria under Gabinius,cotipled with his 
renewal of friendly relations with as many classes of ~he 
popula~ion as V!aS possible, can probably be found ~he 
reason why he found less ~pposition among the Alexandrians 
than did other Roman leaders. 
The ancient historians lay great emphasis on the 
revelries which took place in Alexandria during the winter 
28 29 
of 41-40 B.C. Plutarch describes a band whioh they 
called the "Inimitable Livers", the members of which vied 
with one another in daily enter~ainments of an extravagance 
beyond belief. Most modern historians take the same view. 30 
The prejudice of the sources must be taken into 
consideration. 31 It must be remembered that the onginal 
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sources were written by men who were the supporters of 
Oatavian. Every oalumny against Antony made any odium 
which might attach itself to Octavian ~hrough Antony's 
downfall less effective. 
Cleopatra would not have ~ 'permi tted Antony to 
be altogether forgetful of the business at hand. Plut-
arch tells an anecdote of a little fishing expedition to 
illustrate Antony's love of pleasure and ~hereby misses 
the pOint of the s~ory, Cleopatra's words to Antony, 
"Leave ~he fishing rod ~o us poor sovereigns of Pharos 
and Canopus. Your game is cities, provinces, and king-
doms."32 Cleopatra had induced Antony to come to Alex-
andria ror a purpose. She hoped ~o maintain the power 
of Egypt by the means so often employed by the women of 
the Macedonian line, an alliance by marriage. With the 
Roman legions at her command she hoped to extend Egypt to 
its old limits. 
The power of the women of the Ptolemies must not 
be underestimated. The men of the later Ptolemies, it is 
true, were largely degenerate, but one needs only to re-
view the history of the Maaedonian queens from Olimpias to 
Cleopatra VII to realize why the people of Alexandria so 
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frequently permitted a queen to reign in the presence of 
legi timate male heirs. 33 They vlere women who knew how 
to use their great power and vreal the 34 This made an alli-
ance with 'them imply the command of large resources in men 
35 
and money. The Ptolemies, as the Phanmhs before them 
and 'the Roman emperors a~ter 'them, regarded Egypt as little 
more 'than a crown estate 'to be managed with a view to the 
36 interes'ts of the sovereign alone. The revenue of the 
court at Alexandria was nearly equal 'to 'the pUblic income 
of Rome even after its augmentation by Pompey.37 Thus an 
alliance wi th Cleopatra i'!ould provide Antony VIi th abundant 
funds for a vic'torious Parthian campaign by which he hoped 
to \1in 'the prestige in Italy upon which his hopes for power 
there depended. The weak point in Cleopatra's plan lay in 
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33. lJaha !'fy, ErnP. Ptol. p.405, says tha't authorities do 
not explain this fact. For degeneracy of men vide Strabo 
XVII, I,ll. 
34. ~ahaffy, Hist. Eeypt., p. 212. 
35. One of the last kings of Egypt had an income of 12,500 
talents~ strabo, XVII,I,12, who quotes some speech of 
Cicero probably not non extant. 
36. hlahaffy, Hist. Ptol. p. 147. 
37. Uommsen, Rom. Prov., II, p.188. 
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the fact that the triumvir38 did not personif'y the state 
as did a king ",ho reigned by dynastic right. His power 
was temporary ano. therefore an allianae by marriage \'/as 
not an expeo.ient \':hich a representative of Roman authority 
might use. 39 Antony fully realized from Caesar's ex-
perience the impossibility of forming an actual marriage 
alliance TIith Cleopatra, if he wished to establish his 
power in Rome. Of vrha t value v!ould funo.s f'or his Partl1ian 
campaign be, if in gaining these funds, he lost the end for 
vlhich the Partl:ian campaign \".ras but a means, namely final 
supremacy in Italy? Cleopatra likewise from her experi-
ence realized the fut~lity of anything out a legal marriage 
as a means of establishing her power. Hence the winter 
came to an end without an understano.ing haVing been reached 
and. Antony left Egypt VTi thout funds. 40 
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38. Technically the triumvirate was merely a board.!:!l 
publicae constituendae. It had taken the plaoe of a 
temporary dictatorship, for a board was always more aocord-
ing to Roman ideas than a dictatorship. 
39. Ferrero, Greatness and Decline of Rome, III, p.243. 
40. After the treaty with Octavian at B~usium Antony 
was roughly handled by the troops because he lacked the 
funo.s with which to pay them. 
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1:Ieanv!hile grave disturbances had arisen in Italy 
,,!here Fulvia, Antony's "'ife and Lucius, his brother, ":ith 
the alleged purpose of supporting Antony's interests had 
provoked a ITould-be civil war ending ~ith their deteat at 
the fall of perugia. 41 During these disturbances no \'ford 
had come from Antony except a letter, probably fictitious, 
v/hich had been shorm in the senate stating that" They 
(Fulvia and Lucius) should fight if anyone assailed his 
(Antony's) dignity.n42 Ancienli as vlell as modernhislior-
ians have been liOO ready liO alitribute lihis delay of Antony's 
ali such a crisis, jUSli as lihey ao Caesar's stay when his 
inliereslis ali RODe were in a perilous conaition, liO the 
charms of Cleopatra. 43 Although it must be admitted "that 
Antony gave much of his t~me liO gra liitying his ovm pleasures, 
this cannot be given as the sole reason tor his lack of com-
44 
munication with Italy. The siege of Perugia took place 
in mid-winter when all navigation in lihe Mediterranean had 
ceased. 45 He could not have received this news until the 
---000---
41. Appian,~. V,12 sq; Dio. XLVIII, 5, sq. 
42. Appian, B.C. V,2~. 
43. Gardthausen, Augustus, II, p. 213; 1.ierivale, ~. 
Rome, III, pp. lel-2; Duruy, ~. Rome, III, p. 623. 
44. Plut. Ant. 2e; Dio, XLVIII,24; Appian, B.C. V,ll. 
45. For a discussion of the difficulty of travel during 
the vlinter vide Duruy, ~. Rome, IV, p. 22e. 
ficulties that St. Paul met with are v.:ell' known. 
The dif-
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spring of 40 B.C. after the fall o~ the fortress, too late 
to send aid. Depu~ies rrom ~he colonized veterans had come 
to him on the last transports ·.tlD sail from Italy, it is true, 
but they WOUld have arrived ~oo late in the season for aid 
to have been sent to Lucius. Appian says ~ha~ Antony re-
~ained ~he ve~erans and concealed his intentions. 46 
Trouble threatened Antony from ~he East as ~ell 
as from the West. The time seemed ripe for Par~hia ~o ex-
tend her power Westward. The enormous tribute levied by 
Antony had caused unrest and aissatisfaction. 47 The tyrants 
who had been driven out of the cities in Syria had fled to 
48 the Parthians for support. In addition to this the Par-
thians had the excep~ional good fortune to have a~ their 
service a Roman versed in military affairs, Quintus Labi-
enus. He had been sent to Orodes before the battle of 
49 Philippi to ask for help for the "Liberators". The king 
had detained him for some time in Parthia for he hesitated 
~o conclude an alliance and feared to refuse. \'!i th the 
news of the defeat of his party and of the renewed proscrip-
~ions, Labienus decided to remain among the Parthians. 50 
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46. · Appian, B.C. V,52. 47. Dio. XLVIII, 24. 
48. Appian,~. V, 11. 
49. Flor. IV, 9; VeIl. Pat. II, 78. 
50. Dio, XLVII~, 24. 
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An incitement to uar was found in the attitude 
tce 
of ,A radii toward the messengers sent by Antony for tribute. 
One leader of this embassy, Curtius Salessas, was burned 
51 tbe 
alive. The Parthians thus findingASyrians already in-
clined towdrd aggression were tbe more readily pursuaded by 
the arguments ~hich Labienus set forth to the king Orodes. 
He stated that the legions were at the point of revolt and 
advised an immediate e%pedition into Syria while Octavian 
was detained in Italy by Sextus Pompey and Antony given 
over to enjoyment in Egypt. He offered himself as leader 
and promised to detach the provinces from the Romans easily 
because of the hostility which their treatment had aroused. 52 . 
In the early spring Orodes sent his forces across the Eu-
phrates under the jOint leadership of his son Pacorus and 
53 Labienus. They r~pidly overran the open country between 
the Euphrates and Antioch. 
HeYls came to Antony of the invasion of the Par-
54 thians while he ':laS in Alexandria. 
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He wasted no time in 
51. Dio, XLVIII, 24; CIL, III, 546; vide Gardthausen, AUG-
ustus, II, p. 84, n.lO. 
52. Dio, XLVIII,24. 
53. Plut.~. 2e; Appian, ~. 51. 
54. Plut. Ant. 30 and Dio XLVIII, 27, state that the news 
came simultaneously with that of the fall of Perugia. Before 
accepting such a statement Plutarch's love of dramatic effect 
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delay, but set sail for Tyre immediately.55 . The question 
now arises as to why Antony did not proceed to a vigorous 
campaign against the Parthians. From statements of Dio 
Cassius56 concerning Antony's troops one reason can be in-
ferred. The larger part of Antony's legions Vlere in Italy, 
G 1 d t~ d . 57 au an ~ace on1a. On the other hand the garrisons sta-
tioned in Asia by Antony were mainly troops of Cassius and 
Brutus '7hich he had incorporated into his own forces and 
assigned to garrison duty because they were familiar with 
the country. These men were easily won over to the cause 
of Labienus since they knew him of 01d. 58 This left An-
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must be taken into account. Appian, B.C. V, 52, says that 
only the Parthian news reached him in Alexandria, while the 
ne"IS from Italy came later, pro bably in a seaport 0 f the 
province of Asia. Appian's account seems more pDobable. 
The fall of Perugia and the outbreak of the Parthians took 
place about the same time, but the inclement condition of 
the Mediterranean did not hold back news from Asia. Cf. 
Kroymayer, Hermes, XXIX, p.562; Ferrero, Greatness ~ De-
cline of Rome, Vol. III, p.246, n. 
55. Plut.~. 30; Dio, XLVIII, 27; Appian, ~. V,52. 
56. XLVIII, 24-26. 
57. Ferrero, Greatness and Decline of ~, p. 245, n. 2. 
58. Strabo, XIV, 2, 24, states that Labienus used oohorts 
of the Roman soldiery which had been stationed in ASia. 
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tony without the troops neoessary for a military expedition 
suoh as ~he oampaign into Parthia now promised to be. Henoe 
it can be assumed ~ha~ he abandoned Syria for . the time being 
to return ~o Italy for his legions. 59 Plutaroh, however, 
s~ates ~hat he departed from Phoenioia because of letters 
received from Fulvia lamenting the oondition of affairs in 
60 Italy. The latter reason seems the more probable; for 
with such pressing need of action agains~ the Parthians it 
seems that Antony would have sent for these legions while he 
himself rallied what forces he had in Syria, had he not seen 
a greater need for his presenoe elsewhere. This need was 
"he maintenance of his power in Italy. ~ gre:st 
aim was to es~aDlish an empire for himself in the __ Or.1~nt, 
._./ ~ 
would he not have felt ~hat the need of suooessful aotion 
against Labienus and Pacorus was too urgent for him to have 
gone in person for additional troops and to have stayed 
over two years before returning? It seems that his posi-
tion in Italy was of paramount importance in his eyes and 
the campaign a f ainst the Parthians but a means ~o this end. 
This means, as "vas shovm in his deciSion against a marriage 
with Cleopatra, was not to be adopted if the accomplishment 
of· his great ambition, supremacy at Rome, WOUld thereby be 
imperiled. 
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59. Ferrero, Greatness and Deoline of Rome, Vol. III, p. 
245,holds this view , although he maintains that Antony's Par-
thian campaign was the great aim toward which all his other 
ac~ions tend. 
60. Ant. 30. 
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Antony left Decidius Saxa in charge of Syria with 
orders to defend himself as best he could while he himself 
sailed for Asia by way of Cyprus and Rhodes and thence to 
Greece. 6l Deserted by large n~bers of his troops Saxa 
was defeated in open battle. The casualty list was large. 
As a result Saxa fled to Antioc~)and Apamea, which had been 
holding out against the Parthians, yielded on the report 
that Sa~a had been killed. Saxa then abandoned Antioch 
62 
and fled to Cilicia, while Labienus and Pacorus, emboldened 
by their success,decided upon a division of their troops in 
order to engage simultaneously in two great campaigns, Labi-
63 
enus in Asia 1.1inor and Pacorus in Syria. 
Labienus met with unoounded success. Saxa was 
soon defeated and slain64 and Labienus seized Cilicia. Al-
though most of the to\vns were easily taken, stratonicaea65 
and Mylasa stubbornly resisted. When 1.1ylasa was finally 
taken and razed to the ground, Labienus levied tribute, rOb-
bed temples to gain funds and , in honor of his Victories, 
66 
styled himself Imperator Parthicus • Pacorus likewise 
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61. Appian, B.C. V, 52; Plut. Aa!. 30; Dio, XLVIII, 27. 
62. Dio, XLVIII, 24. 
63. Ibid. 
64. Flor. IV, 9, says that he committed suicide. 
65. Tac. Ann. III, 62. 
66. Not, as VlaS the custom, the man who conquered the Par-
thians, out the man who, as a Parthian, conquered tbe Romans. 
Dio, XLVIII, 24; Appian, ~. V, 65; Flor. IV, 9; VeIl. Pat. 
11,78; Just. XIII,4; Liv. Epit.CXXVI-VII; Plut. ~. 30. 
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met with success. He conquered all Syria and Phoenicia 
wi th the exception of Tyre, \vhich he was unable to capture 
for want of naval forces;67 then he advanced into Palestine. 68 
Relations between Antony and Octavian were becom-
69 ir-g more and more strained, and civil war seemed i~ninent. 
In Antony's conduct in this crisis his decision to maintain 
his power in the r..-est against any encroacrunent on the part 
or Octavian seems clear. His energy and dispatch are hard 
to explain if the influence of Cleopatra and of the East 
were already at work. The determination of the legions to 
70 bring about a reconciliation,comoined with the death of 
the turbulent Fulvia?l were the saving factors which averted 
civil war %or the time being. In September 40 B.C. 72 an 
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67. Strabo, XIV, 2,24. 
68. Joseph. Antig. Jud. XIV, 13,3; Dio, XLVIII, 24. 
69. Dio, XLVIII, 28; VeIl. Pat. II, 26; Appian, ~. V,57. 
70. Appian, B.C. V,57. 
71. Dio, XLVIII, 28; Appian, B.C. V,59; Plut. Ant. 30; 
Li v. ~. CllVII. 
72. Kroymayer, Hermes,.29.,.p. 563. 
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agreement ViaS reached and a nevI partition of the empire was 
made. The boundary line ViaS through Scodra ,73 a oi ty of 
Illyrium supposedly midway up the Adriatio gulf. All prov-
inoes east of this place as far as the Euphrates were granted 
to Antony, all vlest of it to the Ocean to Octavian. 
\ 
Lepidus 
was to retain Africa. 74 There was no discussion of the ac-
cusa tions rlhich had been made on bo th sides. 75 Even the 
soldiery seemed to feel that the reconciliation was not firmly 
established, and consequently demanded the marriage of Antony 
76 
to Octavia, Octavian's Sister, as a pledge of peace. 
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73. Elin. N.H. III, 26. A tovm with rights of Roman citi-
zens situated at a distance of eight miles from the sea. 
74. Appian, B.C. V, 65; VeIl. fat. II, 76; Ferrero, III, p. 
225, sees in this arrangement the first consequenoe of Cleo-
patra's influence, since at the division after Philippi, An-
tony had. claimed provinces in the Hest for himself. He 
probably realized noVl that he needed all his troops in the 
East, and consequently left the task of the defence and ad-
ministration of these provinces to Octavian. 
75. Appian, B.C. V, 64. 
76. Plut.!E1. 37; Appian, B.C. V, 64; Dio, XLVIII. 30. 
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Antony determined not to make the mistake of risking his 
power in the West a second time by returning too hastily 
to the East. He set out for Rome '-'i th Octavian, where in 
October77 the marriage of Antony and Octavia was celebrated. 78 
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77. Kromayer, Hermes , ~ Z9: , ,p. 562. 
78. Appian, B.C. V, 60; VeIl. Pat. II, 78; Tac. Ann. I, 10; 
rlut. Ant. 31; Liv. ~, CXXVII. 
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CHArTER V. 
The Preparation for the Parthian ~pedition. 
As soon as the treaty rri th Octavian ViaS completed, 
Antony turned his attention ~o checking the further advance 
of the Parthians. He sent Ventidius into Asia to command 
1 
the campaign against them. Ahenobarbus had already been 
2 
apPointed governor of Bithynia. He ma.de Lucius Munatius 
Plancus governor of Asia and gave him all tbe legions tben 
3 
available at 3rundusium and in ~acedonia. He ordered Asinl-
us Pollio to mobilize the legions in ~urope for immediate 
transportation to the East f"rom Macedonia, of ,.,hich Asinius 
4 
was to be governor in 39 B.C. 
During the spring and summer of 3~ B.C. Antony re-
mained at Rome busy 17i th Octavian in conciliating as best 
they could the hostility toward them. ~ore and more Antony 
became convinced that to regain popularity and to put his 
power on a stable foundatiort some brilliant and lucrative 
enterprise was necessary. For this purpose a successful 
• raid against the Parthians seemed best suited. To regain· 
the standards lost by Crassus ~ou1d bring popularity in Horre 
and to reHstablish the prestige of Rome in the East would put 
provincial administration on a firm basis conducive to finan-
cia1 prosperity. 
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1. Appian,~. V, 65; Elut. !£!. 33; Dio, XLVIII, 39. 
2. Appian,~. V, 63. 
3. Cf. Ganter, £!£!. ~., pp. 37-41. 4. Ibid. 71. 
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The need was urgent, for Paaorus had supplemented 
the successes of Labienus by gaining control 'ofall Syria 
except Tyre and had advanced into Palestine where he had 
made an allianae with the anti-Roman Jews who had again re-
volted. Antigonus had offered Pacorus 1000 talents for as-
sistanae in establishing him on the throne as a client prinae 
of Parthia. It must be remembered that all Jews did not 
live in the Roman empire. Jews high in rank and aulture 
had dwelt in what was now the Parthian kingdom since the time 
of Uebuchadnezzar. These Jews were not held as apostates 
as were those of the West but were a great source of ortho-
doxy upon which the Jews of other countries could draw. Fur-
thermore they were in constant communication with Judaea. 
Radin5 says that with Parthia the only power still existing 
which was formidable to Rome, the uninterrupted communication 
between the Jews of that section and the mother country must 
nave created a political situation of no slight delicacy and 
may have played a much more important part in determining 
the relations of the governing Romans to the Jews than our 
sources show. 
l!'or many years there had been a pro-Parthian party 
in Judaea, but it must be remembered that this nationalist 
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5. Radin, ~ among Gks and Roms. t p. 370. 
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part¥ fostered hatred against 20me not for political reasons 
alone. Arrayed r:i th it were the Pharisees6 who seem to have 
hoped to :t"ind a greater sympathy and understanding for their 
religious philosophy from the Parthians than from the Romans. 
To the Roman the careful performance of the ancient rites of 
his o\'m cults was lare-ely an impersonal duty toward the vlell 
being of the state, while the 1?harisee made the Torah7 a com-
plete guide to his life not merely in theory but in actual 
prc.ctise. His aim was to learn from what God had revealed 
His uill in regard to every slightest action that a man might 
do. He felt that he must give his uhole concern to religious 
life, to meditation, prayer and the accomplisr~ent of his duty 
toward God and man. The Roman could sympathize Hi th the cera-
monial liisplay and parade of many Oriental cults, but.he could 
not understand the cold reserve and aloofness of the Pharisee. 
Then too t·rom an aCllninistra ti va viewpoint the Roman was op-
posed to the 1?harisee. The Pharisee believed that it wa~ 
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6. Vide supra p. 3. 
7. The Torah rlas no;; merely the wri tten Vlord of the Penta-
teuch, consequently tne term "Law" is not a good translation. 
Torah includes all the divine thought back of the nLaw" and 
might be defined as the written word and the unwritten tradi-
tion taken together. Cf. Travers IIereford, Pharisaeism, pp. 
57-111. 
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necessary to separate himself as far as possible from the 
peoples of the land with the purpose of setting up a closed 
corporation distinct from the surroundine peoples and of pro-
viding for the maintenance of the Jewish cultus. Here he 
was to live his 1,'/1101e life vli th the Torah as a guide. The 
Halachah8 naturally included a large part of the law usually 
covered by a nation's civil and criminal code. Here was an-
other point of conflict between the Roman governor and the 
Pharisee. 
Little is knovm definitely as to the Parthian re-
ligious philosophy, but, as has been said, the Pnarisees 
seemed to feel that they received a greater measure of under-
standing from the Parthian than from the Roman and consequently 
became loyal adherents of the pro-Parthian party. 
Herod himself brought to Rome the news of the dis-
asters ensuing from the rapprochement between Pacorus and An-
tigonus. Hyrcanus and Phaselus had been treacherously cap-
9 
tured. The ?arthians had plundered Judaea and left Anti-
gonus to rule as high-priest and king. lO Herod 
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8. The Halachah ,\las the detailed statement of rules of right 
conduct derived from the study of the Torah. Cf. Travers Here-
ford, Pharisaeism, pp. 95, 96. 
9. Joseph, Antiq. Jud. XIV, 13,8. 
10. Joseph. Antiq. ~. XIV, 13,9. \'lh11e Josephus says 
"plundered" it was really a just levy on a subject province 
for aid given. Antigonus was but little more than a Parthian 
satrap. 
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necessary to separate himself as far as possible from the 
peoples of' the land with the 'purpose ot" setting up a closed 
corporation distinct from the surrounding peoples and of 
providing for the maintenance of the Jewish cultus. Here 
he was to live his whole life with the Torah as a guide. 
~« The Halachah«(note - the Halachah was the detailed statement 
of rules of right conduct derived from the study of the Tor-
ah. Cf. Travers, Hereford-Pharisaeism, pp. 95, 96} natur-
ally included a large part of the law usually covered by a 
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nation's civil and criminal code. Here was another pOint 
of conflict between the Roman governor and the Pharisee. 
Little is known aef'initely as to the Parthian re-
ligious philosophy, but, as has been said, the Pharisees 
seemed to feel that they received a greater measure of un-
derstanding from the Parthian than from the Roman and con-
sequently became loyal adherents of the pro-Parthian party. 
Herod himself' brought to Rome the news of the 
disasters ensuing x'rom the rapprochement between Pacorus 
anQ Antigonus. Hyrcanus and Phaselus haa oeen treacher-
6 ously captured.-- The Parthians had plundered JUdaea and 
left Antigonus to rule as high-priest ana king.1- Herod 
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"plundered" it was really a just levy on a subject province 
for aid given. Antigonus was but little more than a Par-
thian satrap. 
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asked that Aristobulus, grandson of Hyrcanus, be made king.ll 
He accompanied his request wi th a large sum of money vlhich 
he had sent to Idumea for safekeeping when the .Parthlans 
12 
were threatening Jerusalem. Antony however wished to see 
Herod himself king. Roman interests in the East v/ere in a 
critical position. The Parthian invasion and the existence 
of so sxrong a pro-Parthian party in Judaea made the mainte-
nance of Rome's power in Judaea a matter of the highest im-
portance. Neither Antony nor Octavian could leave Rome 
with complications such as there were in the city. It 
seemed better, therefore, contrary to the usual Roman cus-
tom, to have a strong king rather than a tigure-head, since 
he was to oe relied. upon to f'urther Roman interests even 
at the expense of the enmity of his OVln people. The hatred 
of Herod was especially strong in those who hated Rome, either 
through Parthian proclivities or because Rome seemed a danger 
to the maintenance of their institutions. 13 Herod in turn 
was at enmity with the Parthians, whose power threatened his 
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11. Joseph. Antig. Jud. XIV, 14,5. 
12. Ibid. XIV, 36,4. 
1 3. Radin, ~ among Gks. ~ Roms., p. 271. 
very existence. 
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pith this fact set forth as the chief con-
sideration the senate constituted Judaea a ~ingdom and appoin-
ted Herod kl.·ng.14 Th H d b Ii t i f b us ero . ecame a c en pr nce 0 t e 
Romans as Antigonus vras Q:f the Parthians, each nation using 
Judaea as a buffer state against the other. rIith arfairs in 
this condition in the Orient and the I'arthians as Strabo said 
"I.:;,asters in the East" ,15 Antony set out in August or September 
16 39 B.C. for Athens, where he intended to make preparations 
h ·d P thi t ·t 17 IT 1 1·0 r 1s ral. into ar an errl. ory. e panned to winter 
at Athens18 while he arranged afrairs in the East.l~ His ap-
pOintment of Amyntus V18sa case parallel to that of Herod. By 
making this able Galatian officer king of Pisidia he turned 
£0 
over to him the subjugation of that unruly people probably 
because they had un-
---000---
14. Joseph. Antig.~. XIV, 14, 4. 
15. XIV, 2, 24. 
16. Kromayer, Hermes, XXIX, pp. 561-2. 
17. Pluta Ant. 33; Dio, XLVIII, 39. 
18. Plut.!£!. 33; Appian, B.C. V, 75. 
19. Aprian, B.C. V, 75. 
20. The tribes in Pisidia, Isauria, and western Cilicia prac-
tically maintained their independence untl1 th~ time of the 
emplre., After the overthrow of the Egyptian naval pOVier wes-
tern Cl1icia especially became the refuge of pirates. From 
Amyntus' rule in this place is explained the fact that he built 
bimselr a residence in Isauria. Strabo, XII, 6,3; hlommsen, 
Bom. Prov., I, p. 362, n~·l. 
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very existence. With this fact set forth as the chief 
consideration the senate y?0nstituted Judaea a kingdom and 
/11/ . 
appointed Herod king. Thus Herod became a. cl~ent prince 
of ~he Romans as Antigon~s was of the Parthians, each nation 
using Judaea as a buffer state against ~he other. With ~ 
affairs in this condi~ion in the Orient and ~he~art 1an~ ~ 
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as Strabo said "Mas~ers in the East", Antony et out in /laf t)oCJ-., w y 
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August or September 39 B.C. for Athens, where he intendedE)(Q'Y'7~"l' 
to make preparations ror his raid into Pa%thian terri~ory.14 II. 
o 0 ~6 \ ~ 
He planned ~o winter at Athens while he arranged affairs 
. f" in the East .. ];o · His appointment of Amyntus was a case 
parallel to that of Herod. By making ~his able Ga1atian 
. 
officer king of Pisidia he turned over to him the sub3uga-
,, 0 . 
tion of that unruly peop1e17 ~robab1y because ~hey had un-
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~017. The tribes in Pisidia, Isauria, and western Oilioia prao-
1" 
tica11y maintained their independenoe until the time of the 
em~ire. After the overthrow of the Bgyptisn naval power wes-
~ern Oilioia espeoially beoame the refuge of pirates. From 
Ampntus' rule in this plaoe is explained the fact that he 
built himself a residence in Isauria. Strabo, XII, 6, 3; 
Kommsen, Bom. Prov., I, p. 362, n.l. 
-
dertaken another inroad upon Roman territory. 
92. 
2~' Strabo says 
~hat it seemed best for the suppression of robbers and pi-
rates that Pisidia be ruled by a king ra~her ~han by a Rqman 
leader who vlould probably not be there at all times22 nor al-
ways under arms. Amyntus seemed fitted for the task, for he 
had held a prominent position in the government of Galatia 
23 
under Diotarus as secretary and general. As such he had, 
before the battle of Philippi, effected the transition of 
his country tOrom the "Liberators" to the triumvirs. 2~ 
Antony appointed Polemon, son of a rhetorician of 
Laodicea, to the throne of Lycaonia because of his valiant and 
25 
upright conduct. Zeno, his t"ather, and Hybrias of lliylasa 
had raised a force of soldiers and hela their cities against 
the Parthians. 26 In Pontus he re~stablished the national 
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Z3. Dio, XLIX, 32, says only secretary, but Dio, XLVII, 48 
says general also. 
24. Dio, XLVII, 48. 
25. Strabo, XII, 8,16. 
~6. Strabo, XIV, 2,24; Appian, ~. V, 75. 
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dynasty by placing on the throne Darius son of Pharnaces 
and grandson of Mithridates.2~ His reasons for the appoint-
ment of Herod as king of Judaea have already been stated. In 
these appointments it is hardly possible to agree with Appian 
in his statement, "He set up kings here and there as he 
pleased on condition of their paying a prescribed tribute".£8 
Antony seems to have had a very sufficient reason in each 
case in addition to the tribute received. 
Antony does not appear to have had in view, as Mom-
msen states "the erection of an ASiatic great-kingdom after 
29 the model of that of Alexander", . and for this reason made 
all the regions of the East once occupied by Occidentals sub-
ject to himself in the form of satrapies. He ViaS fo110vling 
a policy recognized by Caesar30 and followed later by Octav-
ian,Zl the use of the client prince. True to Roman policy 
he used these princes in forming a chain of buffer states 
against the power of Parthia, thus securing for himself the 
security of the Eastern provinces demanded by the capitalists 
3'2 
in Rome. 
Z7. 
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For a discussion of Caesar's division of the Asiatia prin-
cipa1 cities after Zela vide Judeich, Caesar im Orient, p.149sq. 
Zl. Cf. ~on. AnCyr. 27. 
32. Cic. de Imp. Cn. Pomp., VII, 19. 
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The time seems long between the spring of the year 
40,v/hen Antony sailed from Tyre to make preparations for his 
exp edi ti on, and the summer 0 l' 38, v/hen he re turne d to Asia , but 
this goes but to show that Antony was striving "to maintain 
his posi tion in Italy at all costs, vlhile the expedi tion a-
gainst the Parthians v!as of secondary importance. 
r:hile in Greece Antony :followed the customary metho ds 
or a Roman general. To obtain funds as well as to keep the 
soldiers, who Vlere to go vii th him into winter quarters, in 
training, he sent a part of them against the Partheni, an 
Illyrian tribe which had supported Brutus, and defeated them. 53 
Another division of soldiers was sent against the Dardani, who 
were constantly making incursions into Macedonia. The re-
mainder he kept within easy reach at Epirus. He sent Furnus 
34 
to Africa for the purpose of bringing four additional legions. 
Meanwhile he collected as much as possible of the 
tribute due. The Peloponnesus had been oeded to Sextus Pom-
pey on oondition that the tribute then due from it should 
either be given over at once or should be guaranteed by Sex-
35 tus to Antony. In his zeal to oolleot money it is said 
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Z3. Appian, B.C. V, 75. 
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35. Appian,~. V, 77; Dio, XLVIII, 39. 
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that Antony ordered Lachares, the richest landholder in the 
Peloponnesus to be beheaded on the charge of rOboery.3l> 
Antony YlaS but following the example 01" his illustrious 
predecessor in employing such, means. Dio Cassius says 
that Caesar resorted to assassination to Obtain runds.3~ 
r;hen the stormy season inter:t"ered. r!i th his "'"lork 
outside Greece, Antony gave himself' over to a life of pleasure 
VIi th Octavia, just as he had sp ent the VI in ter of 41-40 vii th 
Cleopatra, merely looking over the reports sent out from 
the armies. He exchanged. ~he display.of a general for the 
simplicity of private life, wore the Attic dress, took his 
meals in Greek fashion, and attended the lectures and dis-
38 
cussions of puolic teachers. He even went so far as to 
entitle himsel1" the younfer Dionysus and insisted on beine 
. 3i 
so called by others. This vms not an unusual practise, 
1"or the Dionysiac ritual differed from others in that in 
the common Greek nomenclature attached to it the inspired 
/ 
male votary \"las himSelf~al(JOS • The spirit of the god 
was supyosed to enter into him, ana thererore for the time 
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311. XLII, 49. 
38. Appian,~. V, 76. 
39. Dio, XLVIII, 39; VeIl. Pat. II, 82; Athen. IV, 29. 
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being he bore the name.'O 
During the winter had come news of the victory of 
Ventidius over the Earthians. He han landed unexpectedly 
on the coast of Asia Minor where Labienus with the Roman 
soldiers that hal b= won to his standards was ravaging the 
country. Labienus ViaS panic stricken, ann sent urgent 
messages to Pacorus for aid. Ventidius forced him to re-
treat as far as the Taurus range where he overtook him. 
Both armies remained in camp for several days, for Labienus 
was awaiting the Parthians and Ventidius his heavy armed 
soldiers. Both arrived on, the same day. Ventidius, 
through fear of the much famed Parthian cavalry, remained 
on the high ground where he Vias encamped. The Earthians, 
overconfident from their former Victories, acted independ-
ently instead of placing themselves under the command of 
Labienus. They charged up the incline and were easily 
routed. They then deserted Labienus and fled into Cilicia. 
Ventidius,on hearing that the soldiers of Labienus intended 
to eS9ape oy stealth auring the night, laid an ambuscade and 
killed or captured the greater part of them. Labienus him-
self escaped to Cilicia, only to be later captured and put 
to death.i4:1 
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After ~his victory Ventidius regained Cilicia, 
and Vlhile he ','las reorganizing the country, sent ahead Pom-
4;2 paedius Silo v7i th cavalry to the narrOVl pass, the Syrian 
4S Gates,leading into Syria. Here Pacorus had sent a de-
~achment under Pharnapates to guard the passage. Pacorus 
left Antigonus to aefend himself as best he could against 
Herod, who was energetically maintaining his position against 
the Parthians, and concentrated his forces in Northern Syria 
and Commagene. 
Silo attacked Pharnapates and was on the verge of 
defeat44 '-'7hen Ventidius came up and by his aid brought about 
a victory. Pbarnapates with a great number of bis followers 
was killed. On the news of this defeat Pacorus retreated 
across the Euphrates for the vlinter, in order to prepare for 
a renev:ed invasion of Syria in the spring.45 
In Palestine Ventidius did little to aid Herod. 
46 Josephus even accuses him o~ coming merely ~or the purpose 
of extracting money from Antigonus. Ventidius was following 
the principles of strategy in striking the main body rather 
than the small divisions. 
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48. Ibid. Dio says that the pass was so narrow that a wall 
and gates were once built across it, hence the name. 
41. Frontin. Strateg. II, 5,37, says the retreat was planned 
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Hor. ~. III, 6. 
Joseph. Antig. Jud. XIV, 14,6. Josephus never displays 
98. 
The campaign of the fall of 39 enced with Venti-
dius in possession of all Syria except the district of the 
Ariadii, who were holding out desperately in fear of punish-
411 
ment for the murder of Antony's legates. . On the neVis 
of these victories Antony instituted a public festival through-
48 
out Greece in thanksgiving. 
At the opening of the spring of 38 Antony laid aside 
all frivolity and continued ""1ith his preparations, Lictors, 
army officers,and guards appeared. Embassies were received 
that f'orrrierly had been kept \'Tai ting, lawsuits were deoided, 
ships launched. and all the work preparatory for the campaign 
49 
set in motion. 
Everything was at last in readiness for the retalia-
tory raid into Parthian territory. Eaoh side was awaiting 
the opening o~ spring to begin hos~ilities. Much to An-
tony's irritation, at this most inopportune time, word came 
from Octavian asking him to come to Brundusium for a consul-
tation. War with Sextus Pompey seemed imminent and Octavian 
was in need of assistance. The summons could not have come 
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4q. Dic. XLVIII, 41. 
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49. Plut.!E!. 33. 
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at a time more illsuited to Antony's interests. Neverthe-
less, he set sail for Brundusium and arrived there on the 
day appointed. Antony was not yet ready for a break with 
Octavian. He needed the prestige which he hoped to gain 
from a victorious Parthian campaign. Furthermore he was 
still lacking in funds. 
Octavian did not appear. Antony wasted no time 
in waiting, but leaving a note to Octavian advising him not 
to violate their previous arrangement,: sailed back to 
Greece. 50 Appian6~ gives several reasons which maybe as-
• sumed for his hasty departure: either that he did not ap-
prove of the war, because he considered it a violation of 
the treaty of Misenum, or that he saw the great preparations 
of Octavian which he judged to be indicative of a future 
struggle for supreme power, or that he 'was frightened at 
the prodigy of a wolf, which entered the camp and devoured 
62 
one of his guards all except the face. . It seems clear, 
however, that,when Antony had made every preparation for his 
Parthian campaign upon the success of which he felt that the 
stability of his power rested, he would seize upon any pre-
text 'to avoid becoming embroiled in a war with Sextus which 
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would,in all probability, postpone his own active participa-
tion in the affairs of the Orient for a year and leave too 
much opportunity for glory ~o his lieutenant, Ventidius, re-
ports ot' whose fur~her success had already reached him. 
Hos~ilities between Ventidius and Pacorus had begun unusually 
early in the season. In fact Ventidius heard that Pacorue 
was ready ~o invade Syria bet"ore his o",m troops were assem-
bled from uinter-quarters. By !"alse reports circulated 
among the Par~hians he led them to cross the Euphrates Qon-
siderably lower down ~he stream and in "~his way for~y valu-
able days were consumed which he used in collecting his o,Vll 
53 forces. 
Ventidius ~ook a position on high ground at some 
distance from the river in Cyrrestioia, offering .no resistance 
to Pacorus' crossing nor taking the offensive after it had 
been accomplished. Once more the Parthians became over con-
fident and assumed the offensive. They approached the Roman 
defenses and boldly charged up the hill. The Romans made a 
sudden sall~and the enemy, taken at a disadvantage were 
driven down the hill. Pacorus was slain. For a time his 
personal guard defended his body, but, vlhen the~e too had 
fallen, ~he rest gave vlay and fled in all directions. Part 
made for the bridge of boats by which they had crossed the 
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river, but TIere cut off and slain. The remainder took 
refuge VIi th Antiochus king of Gomrnagene. 54 By the Par-
55 
thian defeat the death of Grassus was avenged. 
"Iii th the expedition of Labienus and racorus term-
ina ted any advance of the rarthian dominion tovrard the riest. 
So far the Arsacids had adopted the Roman policy, following 
aggression by aggression in its effort to push the ~estern 
boundary to the coast of the Aegean and the Uediterranean, 
but from the defeat of Pacorus their policy became defensive 
rather than offensive. The Parthian method of rlarfare was 
suited for defence on the broad plains of inner Asia, but in-
effective for offense in the rougher regions near the coast. 
The Parthians seemed unable to adapt their military system 
to changed conditions. It remained the same throughout 
their entire history. The Romans, on the contrary, were 
always ready to adapt their mode of warfare to meet new situ-
ations. By a modification of their tactics the Homans com-
5:6. pelled the Parthians to give up hope of dominion in the Vlest. 
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Ventidius easily reduced the rest of Syria, for 
its allegiance to the rarthians was based largely upon the 
personal influence of racorus whose administration had been 
just and mild. 5q He then turned his forces against Anti-
ochus at Samosata, both because he had not delivered up the 
~ugitive Parthians and because of the opportunity for vast 
plunder in his rich kingdom. The king entered into nego-
tiations with Ventic1ius and off"ered to pay an indemnity of 
1000 talents. Ventidius came to no terms v.'ith him, however, 
68 but aVlai ted the heralded arrival of Antony. 
Meanwhile Antony had set out from Greece amid 
great pomp and ceremony. He tOOK a crown of sacred olive 
in conformity to an oracle~e and rilled a vessel vrith water 
from the Clepsydra60 to carry with him.M On his arrival 
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in Asia he ordered lfm.cherus "to go "to the assistance of Herod 
with a considerable force. The adherents of Antigonus had 
resisted every effort of Herod, confident of the final sup-
remacy of their patrons, the Parthians. The Romans had been 
able "to give Herod but little assistance occupied as "they 
were in their efforts to regain their power in Asia. Jose-
phus claims that l1acherus was bribed into inaction by Anti-
gonus. 52 Herod, therefore, de"termined to make a personal 
appeal ~o Antony himself. 63 The time seemed opportune, for 
Antony haC assumed command at the siege of Samo:sata, but had 
met with :far less success than he had an"ticipated. After 
the i·irst rei·usal of terms by Ventidius the people had set 
to work desperately on "the defence of the town. Their ef-
for"ts had me"t with such success that Antony had made but lit-
"tIe progress. Herod arrived ~ith a cavalry and infantry 
force of his OY,rn and a division vThich he had persuaded to 
61, 
.join him at Antioch. Soon after the arrival of Herod 
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':lith these rein±'orcements Antiochus delivered up the fortress 
to Antony, although probably paying a smaller indemnity than 
v;as originally demanded. 6S The fall of Samosata closed the 
season's campaign. 
Here has been found another instance of Antony's 
good judgment in fostering the power of the Idumeans. Herod 
had come to Antony vlhen aid wa s urgently needed. He had 
recognized the principle of military tactics whereby the com-
pletion of the main campaign is required before troops can be 
sent to a less important one. As a reward for his services 
Antony despatched Sossius to Judaea to see that the campaign 
66 
there ViaS carried on ',7i th expedi tion, as a part of his duty 
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6'l 
as governor of Syria and Cilicia. Furthermore, Antony 
appointed Canidius to carryon offensive warfare in Armenia. 6S : 
He sent Ventidius to Rome to enjoy a triumph BIter bestowing 
upon him suitable decorations. 
The enthusiasm at Rome was unbounded. The senate 
voted Antony a triur.J.ph in accordance with the law for he "'as 
commander, but it voted one also to Ventidius, for it felt 
that he had pa.id the Parthians in full for the death of Cras-
sus by the death of their prince, Pacorus. 6a Fate decreed 
that the first man~ to celebrate a triumph at Rome over the 
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Parthians had once been led captive in a triumphal proces-
71 
sion ~hrough ~hese very streets. 
In order that Antony might be in easy communication 
with both Italy and ASia, he decided ~o winter in Greece.?2 
I~ was impera~ive for An~ony to maintain his posi~ion in 
Italy. The lesser campaigns in Asia could well be entrusted 
to his sUbordinates, '\!hile the loss of influence due ~o his 
absence during a campaign would endanger his power at Rome. 
Caesar had tollwed this same plan vlhen he vIas proconsul in 
Gaul, leaving the legions in rlinter quarters under his lieu-
tenants vlhile he himself hastened into Cisalpine Gaul. Caesar 
also furnished a precedent for Antony in leaving Sextus 
Caesar to carryon the n ork of reorganiz~tion in Asia when 
there 1.7aS need of his 0\7n presence elsevThere. 73 
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The present time ~as most suited to make Aritony's 
authority dominant at Rome, for Octavian haa disregarded An-
tony's note left for him at Brundusium in favor of peace 
with Sextus and, ,as a consequence, his fleet had been des-
7~ troyed off Scylla. His funds were low and he feared to 
levy nerl taxes because ot' the ill feeling toward him already 
manifest in Italy.7S In so difficult a situation, the sup-
port of Antony "~las imperative. 
Furthermore the year 38 B.C. marked the end of the 
five year agreement between Octavian, Lepidus and Antony.76 
The triumvirate could hardly be renevled l7i thout d.iscussion 
betYleen the colleages. In addition to this Antony Vii shed 
to exchange his fleet, \'Jhich was but an added e};pense and of 
which Octavian uas in need, for a part of the legionaries of 
7'l Octavian, '."Thich he required. · For these reasons Antony 
felt the necessity of leaving the winter campaign to his 
subordinates and returning to Greece. 
Octavian recoenized the strength of Antony's posi-
tion and resolved to send to him at Athens, Maecenus, Coc-
ceius and Fonteius Capito to treat and, if possible, to ar-
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range for a renewal of the triumvirate. 78 I'mat message 
1:aecenus brought back with him from Greece is uncertain. 
It is probable that Antony agreed to some sort of an alli-
ance and promised aSsistance. 79 APpianSO says that, on 
receipt of the message, Octavian cast off his despondency 
and set to 'work building ships. Relying on Antony's snp-
port in case of trouble, he dared to raise money by renewed 
taxation. 21 Octavian' s efforts at preparation met VIi th such 
success tllat he assumed a far different atti tude to\'Jard An-
tony in the spring of 37 B.C. Octavian feared that his 
own posi ti on in Italy '."Iould be greatly ':reakened by showing 
too open a dependence on Antony. He had done all in his 
power to put himself in a position to demand favorable terms 
from Antony, for he knevI that Antony would be eager to be 
back in the Orient and that forces for his expedition and 
freedom from worry over political affairs in Italy Vlere es-
sential. Accordingly when ,Antony arrived at Tarentum82 vIi th 
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83 his three hundred ships, Octavian postponed his coming and 
ot·fered nu..":1erous pretexts for ~the delay. Antony persisted 
in his efforts, ror he TIished to effect the exchange of ships 
for the needed soldiery. At this crisis Octavia acted as 
mediator,and Octavian finally agreed to an interview. 84 The 
triumvirate was rener/ed t·or a period or five years dating t·rom 
85 January 1, 37 B.C. The reconciliation vIas but a mutual 
d-:d 86 pretence and none felt it to be more so than Antony. 
---000---
83. Appian. B.C. V, 93. 
8~. Ibid; Plut. Ant. 35. 
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authority. Appian, B.C. V, 95, says they renewed the trium-
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It r.'as wi th but Ii ttle satisfaction that Antony 
. . 87 
set sail for Syria, leaving Octavia with her brother. 
The events vThich had just transpired had a marked influence 
on Antony's future conduct in the Orient. From the over-
bearing manner in v/hich Octavian had acted, Antony came to 
a realization of the pOY/er his rival had gained both from 
his absence from Italy and from his inability to gain funds 
for the soldiers in Asia, a task rTLich, it vlill be remem-
bered, had been assigned to Antony by the agreement after 
Philippi. The bankrupt condition of Asia was not appreci-
ated in Italy and Antony's enemies were all too ready to at-
88 
tribute his lack of funds to his excesses while in the East. 
lie realized that the inevitable struggle Yli th Octavian was 
imminent, but "JaS determined to be as prepared as possible 
before the conflict. These conditions must be kept in mind 
in a consideration of his subsequent conduct in the East. 
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CHAl'TER VI. 
The l 'arthian Expedi tion. 
Since "the agreement reached at Tarentum-_ had 
promised to be of so little advantage to Antony, he could 
not but :feel that, if he \'lished to counter-act Octavian' s 
rapidly increasing claims .1;-:0' popularity in Italy, ha.ste 
in "the preparations tor his l-'arthian expedition was impera-
tive. Everything rms in readiness except the financial 
backing necessary for the e~ecution of his proJect. 
During Antony's absence in Italy, his lieutenants 
had been most successful in their nork in the East prepara-
"tory to the expedition. fublius Canidius, who had been 
sent against the Iberians,l had conquered them, brought 
them into an alliance, and \7i th their aid had pushed on 
against the Albanians, v/hom he 11kevlise haa overcome. 2 In 
July 37 B.C. Herod and Sossius had captured Jerusalem. 3 
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t:ehe t·all 01:" Jeruss.lem vms 01:" great importance to Antony tor 
it not only placed the troops which nad been engaged in the 
siege of this city at his disposal, but it also l'urnished 
him 'IIi th a small purt of those :t"unds t·or \".'hich he had such 
need, since it TIas only by means of rich gifts that Herod 
induced Sossius and his troops to depart. 4 On the fall of 
the city Antigonus rlas put to death, I·or much as Antony 
wished to use him in a triumph he realized that, as long 
as a prO-I'arthian prince of the Hasmonean house nas alive, 
the Jews and larthlans qould conspire to replace him upon 
the throne. Josephus, as usual, attributes Antony's de-
Oision to Herod's brlbes~5 This TIas ~ne first time a Roman 
hac ever ordered the execution of a king. 6 In ada.ition to 
this success a~ Jerusalem, Sossins haa conquered the Aradii, 
who had held out against the Romans most resolutely.7 
---000---
4. Joseph. Antig. Jud. XIV, Ib, 1-3; Bell. Jud. I, 17, 
9·18 1-3. , , 
5. Ibid. Antig. Jud. XIV, 16, 4. 
6. Ibid. Antiq. Jud. XV, 1, 2, vlhere he quotes a passage 
from a history of Strabo not novi extant; Dio, XLIX, 22; 
Plut. !£!. 36; Zonar~ 5, 11; Hegessip. I, 31. 
7. Dio, XLIX, 22. 
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Immediately on Antony's arrival in Syria in the 
late fall of 37 B.C.,B he took up again t.he \'lork of admini-
stra tion 'lhich he had begun in 41 B. C. Again.Plutarch9 
states that Antony conducted affairs in a reckless fashion, 
t.hat he gave tetr~chies t.o private persons and~ook kingdoms 
from many rulers. The only example vlhichhe ci t.es, however, 
is Antigonus. For Antony to deprive this Parthian client·· 
prince of his throne in order to establish the pro-Roman 
Herod in his place, showed no lack of jUdgment.10 
It is probable that at t.his "time Antony also en-
i·orced his earlier decision against A:rianat.hes by est.ablishing 
Archelaus on the t.hrone. 11 In 39 B.C. Antony had made 
---000---
B. For a discussion of t.he date vide Bftrcklein, R8m.-parth. 
FeldzUge, p. 24. 
9. Ant. 36. 
10. Gard thausen, AUfUstus I, p. 292, follo,.,ing the view of 
Plutarch, cites t.he case of Lysanias, son 01' Ptolemy, king of 
Iturea (Dio, XLIX, 32). He too ~as charged with giving aid 
to t.he Parthians, (Joseph. Antiq. Jud. XV, 4,1), perhaps un-
justly, out Ant.ony cannot be censured ror taking drastic 
measures against. him, since aib least he VlaS on intimate terms 
~·lit.h Ant.igonus. (Bouch~-Lealerq, Lafj'. II, 254.) 
11. Vide supra p. 49. n. 77. 
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12 Amyntas ruler over PisHlia. On the death of Diotarus, 
king of Galatia, the rule had reverted to his hOlrs. 13 An-
tony nOVl took Galatia from them and bestowed it, together 
14 
with Lycaonia and Parnphylia, upon the capable Amyntas. 
This vms good policy, for Galatia was a region of ASia best 
organized in a military point of viev! and most ready t·or 
action. 15 Indeed the Romans always found its race of fight-
ing men both uset"u1 and" congenial a.nd under the empire re-
cruited largely from them. lb Therefore in preparing for 
his Parthian raid it . r!as essential :t"or Antony to have the 
Gala tians under a ruler upon ,lhom he could depend. 
Everything nOYl seemed in readiness for the cam-
paign, Dith the exception of Tinancial backing. Antony 
had become convinced that all his efforts to secure funds 
had been inadequate. TheEe sovereigns whom he had estab-
listed could furnish him rri th out little in comparison \'/i th 
---000---
12. Vide supra p. 91. 
13. Dio, XLIII, 33. 
14. Ibid. XLII, 32; P1ut. Ant. 61; Strabo, XII, 5, 1. 
15. ~ommsen,~.~. I, p. 363. 
16. Arnolo. , :2om. Imp. pp. 22~-230. 
115. 
his needs, t'or as has been shovm17 ASia was bankrupt. A 
most convincing proof of Antony's desperate need of money 
is the deoased coinage which he issued at this · time. IS He 
had tried every e~~edient to finance his expedition in the 
years since the winter of 41-40, when his hope of gaining 
unlimited resour~es through an alliance with Cleopatra had 
f · "I d l~ al. e • As a last expedient to attaining his Ultimate 
goal of supreme po·wer at Rome, Antony was forced into a 
marriage with Cleopatra. The changed attitude of Octavian, 
the unsatisfactory settlement at Tarentum, and his own bank-
rupt condition had brought matters to a crisis. Antony 
realized that tte inevitable conflict with Octavian could 
not long be postponed and that before ~n open conflict should 
take place he must regain his populari ty vIi th the Roman popu-
lace. The only sure means seemed to be a successful raid 
into Parthian territory and the regaining of the standards 
lost by Crassus. Vith these considerations in mind there-
fore he sent Fonteius Capito to Alexandria to bring Cleo-
patra to Antioch. 20 
---000---
17. Vide supra p. 63. 
18. Pliny,. N.H. XXXIII, 46. 
19. Vide supra p. 76. 
20. Plut.!£!. 36, Bouch~-Lec~erq, Lag. II, pp. 252 sq., 
Gardthausen, Augustus, II, p. 2~1, see no other motive in An-
tony's renewed intercourse Ylith Cleopatra than his love :f:"or 
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By a careful study of the coins Letronne2l has 
shown that in ~he beginning of the year 36 3. C. Antony 
and Cleopatra celebrated their marriage at Antioch 1.'1i th due 
legal procedure. There is also evidence that the legality 
or ~his narriage TIas recognized in antiquity,for Plutarch22 
states tha't at ~his time Antony had t't'lO legal rlives. Fur-
thermore by acknowledging Caesarion as Caesar's heir23 and 
thus sanctioning Caesar's relation ~.,i th Cleopatra, Antony 
showed that he believed that his own marriage vith her could 
24 be considered legal. Furthermore it was not after his 
divorce from Octavia but in 36 that Antony recognized his 
children by Cleopatra as legal. Clearly then he at last 
had acceded to Cleopatra's demand ror a legal marriage. Un-
---000---
her. Ferrero, Greatness and Decline of Rome, IV, p.3, sees 
only a political motive,· but thinks ~his motive was to obtain 
funds for the conquest of all Persia. 
21. Hecueil des inscriptions gregues et latines de l'EgyPte 
Part3, Itj42-H148, II, p. 90 sq. referredtooy Bouch~-Ledlerq, 
Lag. II, p. 257, n. 1, and by Ferrero, Greatness and Decline 
of Rome, IV, p. 6-7. 
22. Com. Dem. cum Ant. 4. 
---
23. Dio, XLIX, 41. 
24. Kromayer, Hermes, 2~, pp. 582-3. 
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der no other circumstance \'lould she furnish him I'li th t"unds 
to ~inance his expedition. It is important to note, hO\'I-
ever, "that the marriage Vl8.S celebrated rli thout any display 
or ostentation, in a Syrian tOVTn, not at Alexandria, that An-
tony did not accept the title of king on his coins, and that 
he "took no step "to break 1'.'i th Octavia. 25 This seems to in-
dicate that Antony's aim '",las still to attain supremacy at 
Rome not to win an empire in the East. \'lith a successful 
Parthian campaign rli th whi ch to command populari ty at Rome 
he would no longer be in need of Cleopatra and ner TIealth. 
The triumphant Homan gener3.l could easily ignore the obscure 
marriage rrith "the Egyptian queen. It was not until his 
raid into Parthia ended in failure "that he gave up hope of 
supremacy in Rome and, yielding to the persuasions of Oleo-
patra, turned his eyes to a kingdom in "the Orient. Until 
that time his entire policy had corresponded to that of 
former Roman generals aspiring to supremacy at Rome. Another 
proof of the legality of the marriage is that Cleopatra fol-
lovled the custom of Egyptian sovereigns vlhen they contracted 
a neVI marriage,by beginning "to count "the years of her reign 
---000---
25. Ferrero, Greatness and Decline of Rome, V, p. 266. 
26 i'roIll that date. 
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Now that Antony felt that financial backing for 
his expedition was assured he hastened his preparations. 
In return for ~he aid given him by Cleopatra he presented 
her \7i th ~he kingdom of Lysanius of Cha1cis. 27 In the 
---000---
26. Pore Tyr. F G H. III, p. 724. For a full discussion 
of the change in date vide Bouch~-Le61erq, Lag. II, p~ 257, 
n. 1 and Ferrero, Greatness and Decline of Home, IV, p. 7, ~~...;.;;.;=~- -- . 
n. 2. 
27. ror. Tyr. F G H. III, p. 724; Dio, XLIX, 32. Sources 
disagree c'oncerning "the gifts to Cleopatra both as to date 
ana whether they were all granted at the same time. . That 
the kingdom of Lysanius YlaS granted her be!'ore September, 36, 
is generally accepted. (Schtlrer, Hist~ Jews, p. 402; Kro-
mayer, Hermes, 2';J, p. b75; Gardthausen, Augustus, I" p. 292; . 
Bouch~-LeSlerq, Lae. II, p. 2b6). Plutarch, Ant. 36, places 
the entire gift and the recogni"tion of the twin chilaren in 
36 before the Parthian expedition. Dio,(XLIX, 32), places 
the entire gift and "the recogni"tion of the twin children and 
also that of ~tolemy in 36, but after the expedition. Jo-
sephus, Antig. lE&. XV, 4, 1-2, divides the gifts and puts 
the date in 34 in connection ,\7i th the summons of Herod :to 
Laodicea to answer for the murder of Aristobulus. SchUrer, 
Hist. Je"\'Is, p.402, n. 5; p. 344, accepts Josephus. Gardt-
hausen, Augustus, I, 29;;;, seems to accept Plutarch \','ithout 
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discussion. 30uch~-Leclerq, Lag. II, p. 255, follov:s 
Plu~arch uithout discussion of ~he date. In an'article 
on Herod in xauly-\'lissowa, Real-Encycloplldie. Kromayer r s 
investigations are discussed and accepted. Ferrero, Great-
~ and Decline of Rome, IV, p. 9 ,accepts Kromayer without 
discussion. Kromayer, Hermes, 2~, pp. 571-585, places the 
donations in 36 before the Parthian expedition. He at-
tributes the difference in time between Dio and Plutarch to 
Dio's carelessness in the chronology within ~he year. How-
ever he fails to note one other point of difference between 
Dio and Plutarch. In ~he recognition of Antony's children 
as legitimate Plutarch includes only the twins. Dio in-
cludes Ptolemy nho was probably born during the Parthian ex-
pedition. It seems ~hat Dio did not place ~he recognition 
of the children and the dona~ions after the raid into Media 
because of carelessness in chronology but because he wished 
~o include Ptolemy. It seems tha~ the birth of a child after 
the legal marriage would be a most suitaole occasion for the 
recognition of all ~hree children as legitimate, a step upon 
vlhich Cleopatra Vias most likely to insist. Therefore I 
follow Kromayer in plaoing the donations in the year 36, but 
I -acoept Dio rather than Plutaroh in pu~ting the date after 
the Parthian expedition. 
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early spring everything \'las in readiness and An~ony set 
out on his campaign, accompanied as far as ~he Euphrates 
28 by Cleopatra. Practically all modern his~orians maintain 
that Antony opened his campaign too late in ~he year,29 and 
on the au~hority of Livy30 attribute the delay to his desire 
to rem9.in as long as possible with Cleopatra. Kromayer, 
on the contrary,31 has proved that Antony entered upon his 
campaign even earlier than preceding Roman commanders, since 
he arrived at Zeugma in February or March. 
Furthermore, even berore his actual departure, he 
was busily engaged in negotiations with ~he Parthian noble 
wonaeses. On the death of Pacorus, the king Orodes had ab-
dicated ~n favor of his son Phraates. 32 There ensued a 
series of atrocities begun .by the murder of all possible 
claimants to the throne_ Since any of the nobility vlho 
ventured to protest were executed, many prominent men, 
---000---
28. Plut. Ant. 3~; Joseph, Bell. Jud. I, 18, 5; Antiq. ~. 
XV, 4,2; Strabo, XI, 13,4. 
29. DrUILann, G~sch. Roms. L, 453; Rav1llnson, Parth. p. f:Ol; 
~ommsen, ~. ~. II, p. 30; Gardthausen, Augustus, I, p. 
293; BouchEh·leclerq, Lag., II, p.255. 
30. Epit. 130. 
31. Hermes, 31, pp. ~0-101. 
32. Dio, XLIX, 24; Justin, XLII, 4; Head, ~. Num. p. 694. 
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among them 1.10naeses, 1'led to Antony for protection. 33 
He represented to Antony that, 1:lith Roman support, he could 
easily overcome the Parthians. Antony was greatly impressed 
by his proposals and an agreement was reached. 34 Meanwhile, 
.Phraates,seeing that he had carried his persecu't-ions to a 
. 
point dangerotis to himself,tad come to terms with llonaeses. 
Antony learned of 'the infidelity of llonaeses, but, in order 
to take 'the Partllians the more unprepared, sent him back 
to Parthia, tp negotiate TIith the king, as if he still be-
lieved him faithful 'to Roman interests. 35 Antony himself, 
ho~ever,entered into negotiations with Artavasdes, king of 
36 Armenia. These negotiations terminated in his deCision 
• 
to att~ck the territory of the kine 01' Medea. Atropatene, a 
Parthian client-prince, 37 vlho had left his country practically 
unguarded by joining his troops 'to those of the .Par'thians on 
guard at 'the Euphrates frontier. 
---000---
33. .Plut. ~ . 37; Dio, XLIX, 24. 
34. Ibid. 
35. Ibid; Flor. II, 20; IV, 10. 
36. Head, ~. ~. p. 636; Dio, XLIX, Z5. 
37. Die, XLIX, 25. 
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In execution of this plan Antony turned to ~he 
north on reaching the Euphrates ,instead of crossing the river 
as ~he Parthians had expected. In order ,to take Medea Atro-
patene ~he more unprepared Antony divided his ~roops. To 
Oppius Statianus he entrusted the baggag~ train and siege 
batteries, \7hile he proceeded by :t'orced marches tOi'!ard Iraaspa, 
38 
~he capitol of 1:edea A ~ropa tene. He at once laid siege to 
~he stronghold. The Median king returned to the defence of 
his country, but, instead of attempting to relieve the siege, 
made a surprise attack on Statianus. The Ronan leader \'las 
defeated and slain TIith 10,000 of his men, and the baggage 
39 
train and siege-engines were captured. Even more disas-
trous for Antony than the loss ot· this division of his army 
TIas the desertion of Artavasdes, TIho inspired either by 
treachery or by fear that Antony's e~:})edition '".'o.s destined to 
failure, r!i thdrevT his troops and left Antony ,:.'i thout the sup-
port of his all essential cavalry.40 
38. Plut. Ant. 
39. j?lut. ~. 
40. Plut. Ant. 
-
p. 294, sees no 
38; Dio, 
38. 
39; Dio, 
trace of 
---000---
Y.-LIX, 25. 
nIX, 25. 
treacl"ery. 
Gardthausen, AUfUstus. I, 
Boucbt!l-Lcclerq, ~. Lag. 
II, p. 258, n. 2, folloVls Strabo, XI, 13, 4, and rlut. Ant.50, 
in acceptinc treason as the cause. H. RaTIlinson, Georraphi-
cal Journal, Vol. X, pp. 113-117 identifies l-ra.aspa '::1 th the 
Qodern Takht-i-Suleiman. Dio uses the name l)hraaspa or 
Praaspa and Plutarch Phrasta. 
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Antony, nevertheless, continued to push the siege, 
until his supplies befan to fail and he VlaS t"orced to send 
his foraging parties to such a distance that they ""ere fre-
41 
quently attacked and aestroyed by the enemy. Consequently, 
feeling compelled to relinquish the siege ana retreat to Ar-
42 
menia bet'ore vlinter set in, he began to retire to the Araxes 
guidea by a 1ill.rdian rlho ,7as well acquainted wi th the country. 
Under constant attack t"rom the rarthians ana suffering from" 
cold and lack of food and water, he rought his way back to 
43 Armenia, but did not winter in that country, choosing rather 
to push on into Syria, where he was me t by Cleopatra \7i th 
44 
money and supplies for the army. Here he left the army in 
45 
v/inter quarters, and departed rTi th the queen for Alexandria. 
In a discussion of Antony's e~~edition against Par-
thia, it is necessary to keep in mine the purpose that he had 
in vievT. ~odern historians, without exception, see in this 
expedition a great campaign of conquest for the purpose of 
---000---
41. Dio, XLIX, 26. 
42. P1ut. Ant. 41; Dio, XLIX, 28; Frontin. Strateg. IV, 1,37. 
43. P1ut. Ant. 41-50; Livy, ~. 130. 
44. Plut. Ant. 51; Livy, ?pit. 130; Dio, XLIX, 82; Ve1l. 
Fat. II, 82; F10r. IV, 10. 
45. Appian, B.C. V, 133; Dio, XLIX, 32. 
46 
completely overthrowing the power of Earthia. 
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It seems, . 
however, from a consideration of Antony's earlier conduot in 
relation to the expedition and from a careful observation of 
various phases of the expedition . itself, that this could not 
have been his purpose. The postponement of the expedition 
whenever affairs 0:1:" import3.nce seemed to need his personal 
supervision at Rome, the point of attack, the route ta~en, 
the fact that he did not plan to take up ':linter quarters in 
Armenia after the campaign, his establishment of buffer ·· states 
along tte frontier instead of forming the territory into ~o-
man provinces, the fact that he had planned for the construc-
tion of no ereat military roads or for placing troops on per-
manent garrison duty throughout the border territory, all 
seem to point to the e ~pedition's being a razzia into the 
terri tory of a l:'arthian client -· prince rather than a great 
47 
campaign of conquest. 
CondItions in the Roman empire demanded such a 
frontier policy. By tl:e end of the republic Rome had 
reached the great permanent boundaries of her empire, with 
but two exceptions, Armenia on the north-east and Germany on 
the north-west. On the north-east ':las the great Taurus 
---000---
46. 1;:olI1-:lsen,~.~. II, p. 30; Kromayer, Hermes, 31 p.~W. 
47. For a discussion of this policy v ,~ Illinois Studies, 
Oldfather and Canter, The Defeat of Varus. 
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range nhose trend is in the main east and west so that 
neither the crest of a long line of mountains nor the course 
of a large river supplied a satisfactory north and south 
48 line between the Roman and Parthian empires. As has been 
seen, nome had adopted the plan of protecting this frontier 
by a series of buffer-states under the rule of native princes 
dependent upon Rome for their authority. That Parthia had 
followed the same policy has been shovm in the case of Pales-
tine and the other Syrian states. Media Atropatene was also 
a Parthian buf:t'er· -state. 
Parthia had gone farther than the establishment of 
these buffer states. To maintain her influence as supreme, 
she had sent troops into the territory under the protection 
of Rome. B.y the successful raids of these forces Parthia 
had materially increased her influence. Antony had _in mind 
a similar plan, a retaliatory raid into Parthian territory. 
Punitive and monitory raids were frequently under-
taken in antiquity v!1thout any attempt \":hatsoever to make the 
49 
conquest pernanent. Caesar had- employed this policy both 
in his raid into Britain and into Germany. It rms also in 
all probability such a raid ~hat he planned to make into Par-
thia. Octavian '"las following the same policy later in his 
---000---
48. Illinois Studies, June, 1~15, Oldfather and Canter, 
The Defeat of Varus, p. 83. 
49. Ibid. pp. 105-106. 
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expedition into Arabia, 25-24 B.C., Hhere there is no evi-
dence tJlat a permanent seizure of the land vras contempl8.ted, 
tne main purpose beine ratner to make a demonstration of 
50 
the vigor of the ne ... , Egyptian acministration. In the in-
vasion of Dacia, 12-9 B.C., and the later raids durinE tne 
Pannonian revolts,6-9 A.D., Octavian merely Dished to assert 
the authority of Rome ~ithout any intention of making addi-
tions to the terri tory of the Empire. 51 Tne success ot· 
these expeditions tended to promote his popularity at home 
as 1.'Jell. 
Antony likewise ~ished to demonstrate the renewed 
stability ot' .2oman rule in the Orient and. by a Victory over 
the ~arthians, to gain favor at Rome upon ~hich he might de-
l)end later in hi s conflict \7i th Octavian for supreme povlcr. 
Antony ~as merely following a policy TIhich Caesar had adopted 
betore him and "!;lhich Octavian favored after him. 
b2 The first Objection to Antony's expedition as a 
---000---
bO. Oldfather and Canter, Illinois StUdies, June,lV15, 
pp. 106-107. 
51. Ibid. p. 107. 
02. The sources t'or the Parthian campaign can be traced 
back to a certain Delli us, r!nO took part in the cnmpaign 
"! i th Antony. Strabo, XI, 1~~3,cites as his authority for a 
statement, "Dellius, the friend of Antony, who ':Trote an ac-
count of Antony's expedition ue-ainst the Parthians in i"Thich 
127. 
---000---
he himself took part and held a command." (~$ 4 r'JCf"IV ~ Lle-A,\.os 
,.. , 
~ ~ , , ... - L\ I «.1"00 O'TfHI.T~/lIa.V o-roo AVTc.)-Y'Ol) ~,)..o$JalJvYrQ.l'o..s Tnv err' lIafolla..ou<;, ,-
, """ """ ' ')...... Co I" ) f:"V h lTo..rnV 1C(l..' a..vTO~ ny~r--0"Vlo..-v E)t't...lY • 
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After he had taken an important part in Antony's admini-
stration of the Orient (Plut. Ant. 2ti; Joseph. Antig. Jud. 
XIV, 15,1; Ibid. XV, 2, 6; Strabo, XI, 13, 3; Dio, XLIX, 
3~) he deserted him for Octavian just before the battle of 
Actium vlhen he t"eared Antony's cause vms hopeless. (Dio, 
L, 13; VeIl. Pat. II, 84; Plut. Ant. 59)., He bought his 
pardon from Octavian by a betrayal of Antony's plans. He 
seems to have gained entrance into Octavian's circle of 
literary friends (Sen. de Clem. I, 10; Hor. Carm. II, 3) 
Consequently he vms ready to follow the example of the 
other writers of the day in lessening any odium which might 
fall upon Octavian as a result of tne fate of the less for-
tunate TriQJlvir by er:lphasj.zing the fault of the "Egyptian 
\'loman". Likewise he felt that he had need of justifying 
his betrayal of Antony and therefore probably exaggerated 
the sufferings of the army and laid the blane for the dis-
aster to P90r management on Antony's part. (Cf. Bouch~-
Leclerq, Hist. Lag., p. 261, n.l) The story furnished ex-
cellent rhetorical matter for the later writers and grew 
wi th the ye ars. 
Oros. XIX, 1-2) 
(Flor., II, 20; Serve ad Aen. VIII, 678; 
For a discussion of Dellius vide Bftrck-
lein, Suell. und Chron. der .rom;"parth. Fe1dzf1ge; pp. 7-15. 
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great campaign of conquest upon the success 0 f which he 
based his hopes of an empire in the Orient, is the post-
ponement of this expedition every time affairs at Rome 
seemed to need his attention. First in the spring of 
40 B. C~ TIhen the raid of Pacorus and Labienus made the 
need of Roman support in Asia imperative, Antony left his 
interests in the Orient to take care of themselves as best 
they might, 'ithile he himself hastened to Italy t.o adjust 
the difficulties threatening his pov.'er there. He remained 
a~ay from the East from the spring of 40 B.C. until the sum-
mer of 38 B.C. If his aim had been supreme povl'er in the 
East rather than in Italy, it seems strange that he '::ould 
have spent so long a time in Italy rather than in the Orient, 
especially when the Parthian victories were weakening the 
53 pov/er of Rome in that part of the empire. ..Again in the 
spring of 38 B.C. he did not sail directly from Greece in 
---000---
53. Ferrero, Greatness ~ Decline of Rome, III, p. 245, 
n. 2,~inds the cause of Antony's departure for Italy and the 
consequent postponement of the Parthian expedition,in his 
need for the troops which were then in Italy. This ex-
planation neither accounts for his long stay in Italy nor 
for the fact that he himself went to Italy for the troops 
instead of entrusting th~transportation to a lieutenant 
y:hile he took command against the Parthians ,rlho were so 
seriously threatening the pouer of Rome. This plan 170uld 
have been !:lore in accordance 1'li th the example set by Caesar 
before the battle of Dyrractium. 
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order to open his campaign in Asia seasonably, but at the 
bidding of Octavian returned first to Italy. Although he 
did not linger there, much valuable time was lost. In the 
spring of 37 B.C. he returned to Italy again in an endeavor 
to protect his interests there before entering upon his long 
postponed Parthian expedition. Antony's readiness to defer 
this expedition whenever affairs of importance seemed ~o 
make his presence at Rome advisable seems ~o point to the 
fact that it was supremacy in Italy rather than in ~he Orient 
for.which he ~as planning and that ~he Parthian campaign was 
but a means to this end, a means to be employed only when 
best suited to further his interests in Rome. 
In Antony's point of attack, the Parthian buffer· 
state, Media . Atropatene, modern historians have seen the 
pre domina te inl"luence of the Armenian king, wi th ""hom Antony 
was allied. Consequently they consider the choice of this 
04 
objective as his first grave mistake. They picture An-
tony as duped by Artavasdes, who wished to turn the attack 
on Media to his own personal advantage. Mommsen55 con-
siders the direction "'hich Antony chose most surprising, 
V 
since all aggression of the Romans against the Parthlans, 
both earlier and later took the route for Ctesiphon, which 
---000---
54. Bouch~-Lec1erq,~. Lag. II, p. 258; Gardthausen, 
Augustus, I, pp. 2~3-4; Rawlinson, Parthia, p. 201. 
55. ~. Prove II, p. 30. 
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ViaS the capital of the kingdom and so situated on the fron-
tier that it ViaS the natural aim of operation for armies 
marching downward on the Euphrates or Tigris. He "thinks 
"tha"t An"tony may have wished to push fOI"Vlard from Atropatene 
countr~T 
into the heart of the enemie~ but 'tnat if this was his pur-
pose, he both ac"ted "Ii thout knowledge of the difficult ground 
and underestimated the strength of his opponents. This ob-
jective, however, has many pOints in its favor, especially 
if the attack is considered as a razzio. ThiS point of at-
tack had been suggested to Crassus by Artavasdes but had not 
been accepted. After the crushing defeat of Crassus, the 
plan which he did not adopt must have been thoroughly dis-
cussed and probably consider~d in a rather favorable light 
in ~ie~ of the disastrous result attendent upon its rejec-
tion. Caesar, on the contrary, accepted this plan and it 
"laS therefore Caesar' s plan as vlell as that of Artavasdes 
56 
"Ihich Antony followed. Caesar had excellent reason for 
his choice. First, the way to Ctesiphon lay thro~gh open 
country in part desert, vlhere the army was alvlays exposed 
- that part of 
to attack by the Parthian cavalry. On the other hand~the 
route to Phraaspa t:- -- ", - - : ' -:rhich vias not through "the 
friendly Armenia lay through a country vlhich although hos-
tile to the Romans \las unfavorable to the Parthian cavalry. 
Second4r,in the case of the objective adopted, supplies rrare 
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57 
abundant, while, as has been said, in the other ca.se the 
route lay in part through desert land. Thir~, it vms only 
wi th Phraaspa as the point ot· attack that Artavasdes would 
furnish the all important Armenian cavalry ,,!hich ViaS experi-
enced in Parthian methods of warfare. Fourtl:il;v ,in case 0 f 
a defeat at Ctesiphon, a safe retreat was practically im-
possible because of the desert character of the country and 
of its advantages to the Iarthian cavalry, while in case of 
defeat in Atropatene the country was unfavorable to Parthian 
methods of warfare, and vlhen Armenia was reached there would 
be a protected line of retreat. 58 
A laCk of knowledge can scarcely have been respon-
sible for the project. Quesar always based his plan of carn-
paign on a thorough acquaintance '~'i th "the topography of the 
b9 land. As a result of the constant warfare bet~een Armen-
ia and Atropatene,Artavasdes must have known the country per-
featly from a military point of view. 60 Caesar probably 
had gained much val~able information from him. Antony him-
self had probably acqUired first-hand knor!ledge of the 
routes "to be pursued when he was commander of the horse 
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TIith Gabinius on his raid against Parthia. As Caesar's 
trusted lieutenant Antony Qust have taken an important part 
in the discmssions of the ~arthian campaign v/hich ~aesar ;~TaS 
planning just before his death. Accordingly it seems hardly 
possible that Antony chose his objective because of lack of 
knowledge of the land. 
If the campaign is considered as a razzio rather 
than a campaign of conquest, the objective seems most suit-
ably chosen. As has been sho\'ffi, the approach lay through 
a friendly country to a point 17here a rapid march could be 
made to the objective Defore the enemy TIas aTIare of the 
hostile attack. In case of defeat there was a protected 
line of retreat. The razzios made by the Romans uere not 
conducted according to the methods of actual campaigns. 
61 
Pi tched battles seldom took place. Its purpose ..,.TaS to 
demonstrate the power of Rome and to show "how far beyond 
62 the actual frontier its outstretched arm could strike". 
ConsequentlY one of the first essentials for the success of 
such a raid TIas rapidity of attack. For this purpose Praaspa 
was an excellent objective. 
Gardthausen63 is of the opinion that Antony's 
route is incomprehensible. This seems hardly true. r.'hen 
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Antony reached Zeugma, ~he starting point for his expedi-
tion~4no~ all of his army was mObilized. Part of his 
legions were VIi th Canidius north or Armenia in Iberia. His 
greatest lack, however, was the cavalry force Which ~he Ar-
menians were to furnish him. None of the Armenian horse, 
which r:as experienced in Parthian methods of warfare, '.tlaS 
Ili th him in zeugwa,65 but \'laS ~o meet him ei ther in Armenia 
itselr or on the way ~o Armenia. Antony's first care was 
to avoid a conflict VIi th the Parthians until his army was 
entirely mobilized. Therefore it VlaS but natural ~hat by 
turning to the north he avoided an encounter 'I":'i th those Par-
b6 thians \7ho were on guard at the Euphrates. His vlhole 
plan rras to make Atropatene the field of ' campaign, '7ith Ar-
menia as th e base of supplies, thereby postponing the conflict 
1'Ii th the enemy until he was fully prepared. Furthermore by 
swinging around toward the north, and choosing the route 
along the Araxes river, as has been shown, the supplies nere 
assured for the army, the passage rlaS protected from the 
attacks OI the farthian horse, in which the main strength 
of the enemy consisted,and there was an opportunity for a 
surprise attack Vlhile the latter were still on guard at the 
Euphrates. By adopting any other route than ~he one along 
the Araxes river, all the advantages to be gained by choosing 
Liedia as an a bj ecti ve vlOuld be lost. 67 
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Historians find a third problem in the haste 17i th 
Which Antony carried on his raid. Following Dellius in 
his desire to place a large share of blame on the baneful 
influence of Cleopatra over Antony,6S modern scholars at-
tribute the disastrous outcome of the expedition to Antony's 
desire to finish the raid in the shortest possible time in 
order to spend the '"linter in Alexandria vlith Cleopatra. If 
the campaign is considered as a razzio, it seems that a 
more satisfactory explanation can be found. As has been 
shown, one of the essentials for the suc cess of such an ex-
pedition was rapidity of attack. The armed force of the 
Romans must appear in the heart of the enemies' territory 
before their proximity vas even suspected. Antony planned 
----just such an attack. He risked a division of his forces 
that he might ensure this necessary rapidity of action. 
The fa ilure of the maneuver rlaS not due to a lack of wisdom 
in its conception but to the treacherY,or at least to the 
69 u 
cO'7ardice ,of "the Arnenlan king. Because of"lack of the 
provisionc necessary for a long rlinter campaign,,"'Antony 
was forced to relinquish the siefe of Praaspa and retire 
into Armenia. Here again there seems "to be evidence that 
he had in mind a retaliatory raid rather ~han a creat cam-
paien of conquest. If An"tony bad spent almost ~i~ years 
in I)repara tion :t"or the calnpaign, it seems hardly probable 
"tha t he r!ould. be forced to five up his first objective be-
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cause o:t" inadequate provision t·or supplies. One ana. t,hc 
S8.."Je o:xplana tion cun be gi yen both tor the haste ShO'iffi in 
the e~pedition and tor tte f a ilure of the siege. Antony 
va s not careless in his prepara~ions or hasty in ~he e~ecu-
tion of his scheme from a desire to be ,-,1 th:;leopatra. _ TIe 
had in mi~d a razzio into tho Earthian buZfer- -state Atropa-
tene, and t ll is he carried out v.'i th energy and despatch. It 
is not to be questioned that he met v ith great suf~erinf on 
his rotreat. 70 3y the loss of the Armenian cavalry he was 
forced to choose a dirficult route through mountainous 
country in order to escape the attacks of the rarttian 
horse •• 71 The easy line of retreat throueh the plain had 
been rendered impossible by the desertion of the Armenian 
cavalry. 72 ~everthe1ess the entire plan had : been carried 
out energetically along lines ~:lJ:ich Antony had learned under 
Caesar, and the risks assumed, such as the division of the 
army, ':fere no greater than Caesar frequently took. The ul-
tima~e railure oZ the expedition detracts in no nay from 
the brilliance of the plan of campaign as conceived by Caesar 
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or t"rom Antony's energy in its execution. 73 
After the retreat of Antony into Armenia it seems 
as t hough he YJould have taken up 17inter quarters there pre-
para tory to a renewed attack in the spring, han he been 
planning the conquest of Parthia. Instead of doing this, 
however, in order to ~inter in Syria,74 he oraved the dan-
gers of' a march through a bleak mountain country where he 
lost many of his men from hunger and cold. This seems to 
be an important indication that Antony planned only a re-
taliatory raid,for in these raids the Romans never took up 
75 
vlinter quarters in the enemies' terri tory. Ancient his-
torians ma intain that his return to Syria was due to a de-
sire to be v:i th Gleopa tra and many modern historians see 
only this reason for his return. Ferrer0 76 maintains that 
Antony had in vieIT the conquest of Persia, but that the 
political situation in the Roman \7orld TIas such that his 
absence for a longer period TIas impossible. If Antony had 
spent five years in so arranging his affairs tha t he could 
undertake this expedition, as Ferrero maintains, it seems 
that he ,"!ould have taken into considera tion the neceesi ty of 
wintering in the interior. Bouch~-Leclerq77 assigns as a 
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reason ~he fear of rurther ~reachery on ~he part of Arta-
vasdes. If the flight of the Armenian cavalry rlaS due to 
treachery rather than actual panic, Artavasdes would be 
only too ready to \'mrd off the punishment vlhich vms sure to 
t·all to his lot by conciliating Antony in every possible way. 
The risk of treachery on the part of the Armenian king does 
not seem to be a sufricient cause for ~he exPosure of his 
men to the actual dangers of cold and starvation in a winter 
march across the mountains, if Antony had expected to renew 
his campaign in the spring. 
Antony, like ~he other great Roman leaders, had 
out t \70 "fays of dealing vii th the frontier, "ei ther the con-
stant pushing fornard of the lines of the empire or the but-
tressing of the frontier by ~orming a series of buffer 
, 78 
states". In the pursuance of the latter plan there was 
need to keep fear ot· the mili tary pOYler of Rome constantly 
79 in the minds of the people. As has been shovm by numer-
ous examples,the razzio, seemed the best means of accomplish-
80 ing this end. It has been shovm that from Antony's first 
entrance into the Orient he consistently follovled the policy 
of establishing states on the rrontier under native princes, 
whose authority rested solely on the authority of Rome. It 
seems only natural that he would continue the line of policy 
thus far established by gaining prestige for Roman arms by 
means of a raid into Parthian territory. Antony had taken 
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no steps to ~orm the territory along the ~rontier into 
Roman provinces vThere Roman troops "'Tould be stationed on 
permanent garrison duty, nor had he made any efforts to con-
struct in these districts the Roman roads so all-important 
for military success, if permanent conquest was in viev1. In 
the actual conduct o~ campaigns of conquest such steps were 
81 
essential. Therefore Antony's postponement o~ the ex-
pedi tion \7benever affairs in Italy demanded his presence "there, 
his choice of a buf~er- - state of Parthia as the point o-f attack, 
his selection of a route by which a rapid descent into the 
enemies' territory could be made without their knowledge, the 
fact that he considered rapidity in attack of such importance 
that he endangered the success of the expedition by a divi-
sion of his troops, his omission to make provisions for tak-
ing up winter quarters in the interior, and his adoption 
from his entry into the Orient of a policy -of defending the 
frontier by establishing buffer - states rather than by pushing 
fOr\-rard the boundaries of the empire, all are cogent reasons 
pointing to the fact that Antony's expedition into Parthia 
ViaS a retaliatory raid rather tr.an a campaign of conquest. 
~';"i th the disastrous termination of the Parthian 
campaign Antony's hope for supremacy at Rome appears to have 
ended. Henceforth all his actions indicate that he felt com-
pelled to base his hopes for power on a kingdom in the East 
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'.'lith Egypt as the corner-stone. 
Immediately upon Antony's return to Syria, Cleo-
82 
patra met him TIith supplies for the army. He no longer 
made any effort to keep his marriage secret, but openly 
recognized Cleopatra as his wife by declaring their three 
children legitimate. 83 In addition he granted - -' her the 
central portion of the Phoenician coast, namely from the 
Eleutherus river south to the territory of Sidon,84 the 
balsam lands of Jericho tOrom the kingdom 0 fO Herod, and cer-
tain portions from the kingdom of the Nobateans. 85 After 
these arrangements had been made, Antony returned to Egypt 
with Cleopatra to spend the winter in Alexandria. 
A change in Antony's policy seems clearly evident 
from this time on. Tte news of his gifts and of his recog-
nition of his children by the Egyptian queen created, as 
Antony could well expect, an outspoken feeling against him 
in Rome. 86 The astute Octavian now adopted a plan vThereby 
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Antony would be compelled to disclose his aims. He sent 
Octavia to Antony ':ri th reinforcements and supplies. On 
reaching Athens she received letters from Antony in Y/hich 
he commanded her to remain there, since he ViaS now in Syria 
preparing for an expedition against Armenia. Antony, how-
ever, did not carry out this intended expedition, but, after 
he had accepted "the gifts rrhich Octavia had brought him, re-
mained in Syria ~or some "time TIith Qleopatra and ~inally re-
turned to Alexandria in ber company.87 
Antony had given his ansv/er to Octavian. Hereto-
fore he had made every effort to avoid a break with his col-
league. Again and again he had pos"tponed his Parthian ex-
pedition in order to maintain his influence at Rome by peace- " 
fUl means. T1:e repudiation ot' Octavia is significant, not 
alone as ~ challenge to her bro"ther, but as an indication 
that Antony no longer sought popularity at Rome. Octavia 
VIas one of the most highly revered vromen 0 f Roman history. 
Antony could not but have realized the natred that he ,,!ould 
arouse by the insults which he heaped upon her. \'iben it is 
rememberd that upon popularity vIi th Roman oi vilians as \'!ell 
as with the soldiery depended to a large extent his success 
in attaining his goal or supreme power at Rome, this change 
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of attitude appears most significant. 
It seems then that Antony was determining upon 
dominion in the Orient at the cost o~ power at Rome. Once 
having come to this de~ision it is characteristic of the 
man that he was as zealous in his efforts to antagonize the 
Romans as before he had been eager to conciliate them. Af-
ter a successful raid into Armenia for the especial purpose 
of plunder88 Antony placed the crovming insult upon the out-
raged feelings of the Romans by celebrating a Roman triumph 
at Alexandria. 89 At this triumph he granted territory to 
Cleopatra and her children and filled out Egypt to the 
boundaries of its former power, and this too at the price of 
such Roman territory as Cilicia and portions of Syria. As 
a further insult to Octavian he proclaimed Caesarion the 
90 legal heir of Julius Caesar. 
~itn the defeat of the Parthian expedition by the 
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success of uhich Antony had hoped to establish his populari-
ty at Rome, it seems clear that he changed his aim ~or 
supreme povler at Rome to the hope for a kingdom in the East 
vii th Egypt at its head. ilis open recognition of Cleopatra 
as his wife by the aeclaration of their children as legiti-
mate, his large grants of territory to her, his direct an-
s~er to Octavian's clever device of sending Octavia to him 
wi th troops, his 00 nquest 0 f Armenia and the subsequent ad-
dition of that territory along uith portions of the Roman 
provinces "to ~leopatra's domain, the great triumph ,!Thich he 
celebrated at Ale~andria, and his recognition of Caesarian 
as the heir of' Julius Jaesar, all are evidence that Antony's 
policy in the Orient nas no longer that of D. Roman general 
follo~infin the footsteps of his predecessors in their 
strufgle for supremacy at Rome. 
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